Marquette Law Review
Reason to believe a person may be involved in criminal activity is not necessarily also reason to believe that person is armed and dangerous. "Stop and frisk," therefore, more accurately should be thought of as "stop and maybe frisk." But courts have conflated or ignored these two distinctive kinds of suspicion, inviting police officers to frisk automatically during an investigative detention, a practice that ignores the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment and subjects suspects to the indignity and intrusion of a search unsupported by any level of suspicion. This article explores some of the ways in which this undermining of Terry v. Ohio has occurred, and why the important values achieved by prudence should not be used casually to trump individual freedom from search.
Gerald S. Reamey, What’s Fear Got To Do With It?: The “Armed And Dangerous” Requirement Of Terry, 100 Marq. L. Rev. 231 (2016).