Alexa Hears with Her Little Ears—But Does She Have the Privilege?

Lauren Chlouber Howell
COMMENT

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BUT DOES SHE HAVE THE PRIVILEGE?

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I. INTRODUCTION


A: I suggest the crime was committed by the assistant, Alexa, in the Study, with her Always-On Technology.

In a scenario similar to the infamous game of Clue®, Alexa or the other assistants could either be the detective or the culprit—or both. This principle is illustrated by Susan Allen in her comment entitled Privacy in the Twenty-First Century Smart Home:

The existence and purpose of the Echo may seem innocuous enough as it serves as a personal in-home assistant meant to increase its user’s convenience, yet it is vital to recall that unlike a human assistant that goes home at the end of every shift, the Echo is always listening.

For those not yet well-acquainted with the assistants, Alexa and her friends—Siri, Cortana, Google, Bixby, and Moto (Voice)—can be summoned from various devices such as cell phones or smart home speakers and have valuable uses beyond playing music or giving the user


2. The Amazon Echo (Echo) or its respective assistant, Alexa, may be referred to individually throughout this Comment, but the statements and suggestions contained herein apply to virtual, personal, or digital assistants as a whole. See generally Maurice E. Stucke & Ariel Ezrachi, How Digital Assistants Can Harm Our Economy, Privacy, and Democracy, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1239 (2017) (discussing the implications of the various digital assistants). They may also be referred to collectively as “assistants” or denoted colloquially with gendered pronouns.

3. Cf. PARKER BROTHERS, supra note 1, at 5 (instructing how to suggest the manner by which the crime was committed in gameplay, such as: “I suggest the crime was committed in the Lounge by Mr. Green with the Wrench.”).

4. See generally id.


7. See Robert D. Lang & Lenore E. Benessere, Alexa, Siri, Bixby, Google’s Assistant, and Cortana Testifying in Court, 89 N.Y. ST. B.J. 8, 9 (2017) (“Although ‘speech recognition’ may sound like a lofty
today’s weather.⁸ For instance, they can make calls from the device itself once the user’s phone is connected to the service,⁹ quickly provide accurate answers to fairly complex mathematical questions,¹⁰ keep track of attorneys’ billable hours,¹¹ store patient or client information,¹² and more.¹³ However convenient, the assistants have recently started making waves in term, it simply refers to what most of us do daily, when we use our voices to ask our phones to dial our friends, our cars for directions, and our speakers to play our favorite songs. Speech recognition is ‘the ability to speak naturally and contextually with a computer system in order to execute commands or dictate language.’ Technology rivals are hard at work creating irresistible versions of easy-to-use devices with which we can talk and have questions answered.” (footnote omitted).

⁸. See Jason Beahm & Cameron Bowman, *Alexa, Are You a Snitch?*, 36 NO. 3 GPSOLO 56, 57 (2019) (describing the benefits of smart devices and the virtual assistants within them); Lang & Benessere, *supra* note 7, at 10 (“For most people, their virtual assistants’ ability to always be listening for their ‘wake words’ is helpful. When we are driving, this allows us to complete tasks hands-free, avoiding distractions, as well as moving violations. While we are making breakfast in the morning, contemplating getting to work or to court on time, we can ask Alexa how long the morning commute will take. Alexa also allows us to use voice commands to turn on the light while walking into a dark room, without having to search for the light switch.”)

⁹. See Jeffrey Allen, *Digital Virtual Assistants: Utility vs. Privacy*, 36 GPSOLO 4, 4 (2019) (describing a study of the fifteen most popular tasks performed by virtual assistants; although placing phone calls was absent from the list, the author notes he has noticed more people using their virtual assistant to place calls in the home, office, and car).


¹¹. See Sharon D. Nelson & John W. Simek, *Are Alexa and Her Friends Safe to Use in Your Law Office? The Pros and Cons of Personal Assistants*, 61 RES GESTAE 41, 41 (2018) (noting virtual assistants can assist attorneys with recording their billable time); Whitney L. Hosey, Comment, *Alexa, Transmit Client Data to Amazon: Ethical Considerations for Attorneys Looking Forward to Virtual Assistants*, 19 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. 51, 56 (2018) (describing the process by which attorneys may track billable hours with Alexa). But see id. (“[T]here are many risks associated with this technology as well, including the ability to create unique profiles on individuals, and store information which can potentially be leveraged against them in a legal proceeding.”).


¹³. See Nelson & Simek, *supra* note 11, at 42 (describing other simple tasks virtual assistants are able to perform for the attorneys, thereby increasing efficiency in the workplace, including “adding entries to calendars, setting reminders, calling people in your contacts, [and] getting directions”).
the legal community due to the aforementioned privacy issues that arise from utilizing them for some of these seemingly innocent tasks.

As admittedly vital as it is to keep these privacy issues in mind, it is presumed many do not know the extent of Alexa’s listening and recording capabilities. If people are aware of the eavesdropping nature, it is likely they do not constantly consider it, or they trust the receiver of the data to use it responsibly. Prior to writing this Comment, the author rarely contemplated the ramifications of having multiple smart devices in her home and on her person at any given time. Similarly, others have expressed their lack of knowledge regarding the assistants’ reach and how to overcome these unknowns. For instance, Jeffrey Allen commented:


15. *Digital Virtual Assistants*, supra note 9, at 4 (providing a list of the fifteen most common tasks requested of a virtual assistant).

16. See Allen, supra note 5, at 176 (encouraging keeping the privacy risks surrounding the virtual assistant in mind).

17. See Allison S. Bohm et al., *Privacy and Liberty in an Always-on, Always-Listening World*, 19 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2017) (referencing a surprising 2015 privacy policy released by Samsung that “sparked the ire of [many] privacy advocates” when it stated: “Please be aware that if your spoken words include personal or other sensitive information, that information will be among the data capture . . . and transmitted to a third party through your use of Voice Recognition.”); Daniel J. Solove, *A Taxonomy of Privacy*, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 494 (2006) (“In many instances, people are not directly aware that they are being observed.”); *Digital Virtual Assistants*, supra note 9, at 5 (drawing attention to a societal lack of awareness of the abilities of virtual assistants and available procedural safeguards).

18. Cf. Solove, supra note 17, at 495 (“In fact, there can be an even greater chilling effect when people are generally aware of the possibility of surveillance, but are never sure if they are being watched at any particular moment.”).

19. See Bohm et al., supra note 17, at 5 (“You are vaguely aware that [the recorded voice data] . . . is stored on corporate servers, but you are not sure what information is stored, and you trust the company not to abuse it.”).

20. Rani Molla, *People Say They Care About Privacy but They Continue to Buy Devices that Can Spy on Them*, VOX (May 13, 2019, 5:40 PM), https://www.vox.com/recode/2019/5/13/18547235/trust-smart-devices-privacy-security [https://perma.cc/XK3Y-6MMV] (“Even people who are tech savvy have a difficult time finding and understanding this information,” according to an internet technology program manager. He also described a situation where a friend of his, well-versed in technology, “was tearing her hair out trying to find a baby monitor that was good for security and privacy.”).

21. Jeffrey Allen is the principal in an Oakland, California law firm, Graves & Allen. He is also Editor-in-Chief of GPSolo magazine, and he frequently speaks on technology topics. *Digital Virtual Assistants*, supra note 9, at 4.
I cannot help but wonder what percentage of the customers even know that Amazon made the recordings, let alone that they have the ability to delete the recordings. I am fairly aware of things going on in the technological world. While I have known for some time that Amazon made the recordings and reviewed them, I did not know about deleting them until the release of the response [by Amazon] to [an inquiry by] Senator Coons [regarding Alexa’s privacy practices].

However, awareness regarding the reach of digital assistants is on the rise—and concerns are growing. In a 2019 study by Microsoft, surveying 7,000 people, 72% reported using one of the aforementioned assistants via a smart device or through their vehicle. Among those who reported using a digital assistant, “41% . . . reported concerns around trust, privacy and passive listening.” The other 59% should probably be concerned too.

According to a Bloomberg article entitled Amazon Workers Are Listening to What You Tell Alexa, these concerns motivate millions not to allow smart home devices into their homes based on the fear the companies are listening. Despite the rapid permeation of virtual assistants, many users may not be aware of the plethora of legal, evidentiary, security, and privacy issues arising from (1) active and passive listening, (2) subsequent recording by the assistants, and (3) similar emerging technologies.

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22. Id. at 5.
24. See Olson & Kemery, supra note 23, at 8 (discussing the rising prevalence of digital assistants).
25. See id. at 6 (providing statistics regarding consumer distrust of digital assistants).
26. See discussion infra Sections II–IV.
28. Olson & Kemery, supra note 23, at 10 (declaring the majority of people have now “used voice search and voice commands through a digital assistant”).
29. Devices such as drones, webcams, Nest Cam, Kapture, OrCam, and keystroke recording software may have similar ramifications. Gray, infra note 6, at 6.
This Comment explores some of these issues and offers two suggestions in an attempt to prevent the assistants from going too far and disclosing otherwise protected speech:

(1) Extend the protection of the existing privileges to the virtual assistants—allowing holders and claimants of existing privileges to block virtual assistants’ disclosure of privileged conversations, so the assistants may not, in essence, testify against a person regarding speech which would normally be protected; and

(2) Create a so-called “Castle” Privilege—essentially protecting private utterances made in the presence of virtual assistants except in circumstances where a warrant was lawfully and reasonably obtained based on probable cause—ensuring people feel comfortable in their own homes, where they would ordinarily have a legitimate expectation of privacy.

II. BACKGROUND

Understandably, one of the issues which makes some people wary of virtual assistants is the privacy policies—or lack thereof—surrounding the waking procedure. Each voice-activated assistant typically has an assigned wake word or phrase—the utterance of which is intended to indicate the user would like the assistant to start listening and respond accordingly—however, some of the assistants allow their owners to choose the word or phrase. Although this can be a very convenient means of using the

30. See discussion infra Section IV.
31. See discussion infra Section IV.
32. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
33. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding persons may have a reasonable expectation of privacy not only in their homes, but also in other areas—such as telephone booths—wherein there is a justifiable reliance on privacy).
34. See Raphael Davidian, Alexa and Third Parties’ Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. ONLINE 58, 58 (2017) (discussing privacy implications connected to the waking of the assistants).
35. See Gray, supra note 6, at 6 (providing the assigned wake words of the speech activated assistants).
36. See id. at 5 (describing the ability of “speech activated devices . . . to remain in an inert state of passive processing, or ’listening,’ for a pre-set ’wake phrase’”).
37. See id. at 6 (discussing “wake phrases” of the various assistants).
the technology surrounding waking the assistant is neither as simple, nor as full-proof as one might imagine—and has serious privacy implications.39

In order for the assistants to be summoned upon hearing the wake word or phrase, the devices must always be listening and are therefore sometimes referred to as “always-on” devices.40 As noted by Amazon, Alexa begins recording a fraction of a second prior to the utterance of the wake word and begins transmitting it41 to “the cloud.”42 Therefore, the Echo series of devices are always recording and just, hopefully, stop transmission to the cloud and delete the unintentional data compilation once the more advanced “cloud verification” denies detection of the wake word.43

Amazon has recently gone a step further, though, and filed a patent application which would allow Alexa to process commands prior to a wake word in order for users to interact more naturally with the device.44 For example, the current command structure required to have an Echo device tell a joke is, “Alexa, tell me a joke,” whereas under the new patent, one

38. See Beahm & Bowman, supra note 8, at 57 (balancing the convenience of the personal assistants and the associated privacy implications); Lenore Benessere & Robert D. Lang, The Rise and Danger of Virtual Assistants in the Workplace, BUS. L. TODAY (Feb. 15, 2018), https://businesslawtoday.org/2018/02/the-rise-and-danger-of-virtual-assistants-in-the-workplace/ [https://perma.cc/U7VG-88MT] [hereinafter Rise and Danger of Virtual Assistants] (discussing the convenient nature of voice-activated personal assistants); Allen, supra note 5, at 176 (emphasizing the fact that increased convenience is the intended purpose of digital assistants).

39. See discussion infra Sections II–III.


42. “Cloud storage is a cloud computing model that stores data on the Internet through a cloud computing provider who manages and operates data storage as a service.” Cloud Storage, AMAZON, https://aws.amazon.com/what-is-cloud-storage/ [https://perma.cc/DJ7X-AS25].

43. See Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 41 (discussing the Amazon cloud verification process); Gray, supra note 6, at 6 (“Until [the devices detect a key word], they remain in an inert state of buffering and re-recording, allowing the microphone to passively ‘listen’ for a key word without recording or transmitting information.”).

could say, “tell me a joke, Alexa,” and achieve the same results. Based on the way the inventors describe the programming behind the audio retention and processing within this proposed system, this plan would allow Amazon to retain significantly more recorded data. Although this is a novel advancement, devices utilizing similarly constant and pervasive recording and retention technologies have historically evoked suspicion and criticism in the courts.

Communications uttered around a smart device assistant are less secure if the assistant is set to wake via voice command, as mentioned above, as it can wake inadvertently. For instance, communications around the Amazon Echo are not highly secure since the Echo is voice-activated and therefore records conversations in error when the assistant incorrectly perceives a wake word. If a person says, “I was following a Lexus,” a

45. See id. (describing Amazon’s new “computer-implemented method for processing a spoken command when the wakeword does not begin the command”).

46. See id. (“When the system detects a wakeword within a particular utterance, the system determines the most recent utterance change location prior to the wakeword and sends the audio from that location to the end of the command utterance to a server for further speech processing.”).


48. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 (2014) (distinguishing the search of cell phones from physical records due to the inherent “element of pervasiveness”); People v. Majstoric, No. C082728, 2019 WL 5688702, at *1, *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2019) (holding a criminal defendant was not required to submit his technological devices for “search and seizure . . . any time of the day or night” after he accepted probation). In Majstoric, the court held such a condition was a violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights, statutes, case law, and the privilege against self-incrimination. Supporting its conclusion, it quoted the Supreme Court of California, which had reasoned in another recent case:

If we were to find this record sufficient to sustain the probation condition at issue, it is difficult to conceive of any case in which a comparable condition could not be imposed, especially given the constant and pervasive use of electronic devices and social media by juveniles today. In virtually every case, one could hypothesize that monitoring a probationer’s electronic devices and social media might deter or prevent future criminal conduct.

In re Ricardo P., 446 P.3d 747, 754 (Cal. 2019).


nearby Echo device will likely wake due to misunderstanding “a Lexu--” as “Alexa.” If the individual were looking straight at the device and paying attention, they would see a blue circle light up on the device, could command Alexa to stop, or could even delve into their device’s history to delete the inadvertent recording. However, privacy concerns multiply if the person does not notice it has started recording as Alexa, by default, does not announce when she begins recording, although users may enable the “start of request” sound. Nevertheless, communications around devices that are set to wake by a method other than a wake word or phrase, such as pressing or holding a button, are considered more secure. Although virtual assistants can similarly be unintentionally triggered via accidentally holding down the button, this happens far less often than by inadvertent

51. See Davidian, supra note 34, at 58 (providing an example of how the assistants may be woken inadvertently).
52. See id. at 59–60 (illustrating how Alexa notifies the user the interaction is being recorded). But see Craig Lloyd, How to Make Your Amazon Echo Play a Sound When You Say “Alexa”, HOW-TO GEEK (June 20, 2017, 4:53 PM), https://www.howtogeek.com/297966/how-to-make-your-amazon-echo-play-a-sound-when-you-say-alexa/ (“If your Echo isn’t someplace where you can see it easily, enabling the audio tones is a great way to make sure that Alexa heard you [or did not] without guessing.”).
54. In an Amazon FAQs section, What about “false wakes”? Amazon acknowledges and addresses these inadvertent wake scenarios. They state a solution to this issue is to “review and delete the voice recordings associated with your account (including any audio resulting from a false wake) in your Voice History available in the Alexa app.” Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 41.
56. See Alexa and Alexa Device FAQs, supra note 41 (describing how to enable “wake up” sounds either through the Alexa app or by voice request); Lloyd, supra note 52 (informing users this is not a universal feature and the setting will need to be adjusted for all Alexa devices).
57. For instance, iPhone users can choose to change their Siri settings to wake “her” by holding down the home button or holding down the power button, depending on the phone model, rather than by using the wake phrase. See Digital Virtual Assistants, supra note 9, at 6 (implying users may feel more comfortable enabling Siri to wake by pressing a button). Similarly, the newer Amazon Tap is more secure than its Echo counterparts as the user must touch the button to activate the microphone, meaning it is not listening constantly for the wake word or phrase, and the likelihood of inadvertently waking the device is less. See Wojkowski, supra note 49 (discussing features of the Amazon Tap).

boughman/ [https://perma.cc/EWD3-MJKX]; Manning, supra note 40, at 28 (describing a situation in which a murder occurred “and law enforcement hoped [Alexa] was accidentally triggered to record the events”).
voice activation. Additionally, the user has greater control over the data since the virtual assistant is not listening until the press of the button.\(^{59}\)

If the smart device does not have an option to summon the assistant via pressing a button, the voice-activated device’s security can be increased slightly by requiring the device to respond to certain voices, or at least limiting access to certain data depending on the user.\(^{60}\) Some of the assistants respond to voices other than that of the purchaser, some respond to specified voice patterns and intonations, and some will respond to any voice by the default setting.\(^{61}\)

### III. CONCERNS

#### A. Privacy Rights Under the Fourth Amendment

We live in a world of diminishing privacy. Walls and doors once protected our personal secrets from governments as well as nosy neighbors. Today, our hyper cyber-connected life has created ocean-sized data flows, a potent information marketplace, and public revelation of personal and even intimate secrets, some usually reserved in the past only for individual diaries or discussions behind closed doors. If a person lives “on the grid,” her intimate and valued information sooner or later likely will be subject to access to third parties . . . . Significantly, big chunks of this information can end up in government hands, to be stored indefinitely and used without oversight.\(^{62}\)

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59. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 11, at 42 (explaining Samsung has opted to have Bixby respond by pressing a button).

60. See id. (pointing out although “Alexa can distinguish voices for access to some data, it is” still not as secure as it would be if it to require other access credentials); Anne Logsdon Smith, Alexa, Who Owns My Pillow Talk? Contracting, Collateralizing, and Monetizing Consumer Privacy Through Voice-Captured Personal Data, 27 CATH. U. J.L. & TECH. 187, 191–94 (2018) (discussing the possibility to create specific voice profiles, thereby increasing security over certain personal account data).

61. See Nelson & Simek, supra note 11, at 42 (describing some virtual assistants’ abilities to differentiate between users’ voices); see Smith, supra note 60, at 191 (“Google and Amazon have enabled their devices to distinguish between multiple users and associate their voice with their own personal account.”).

With emerging technologies on the rise in recent years, the right to privacy is the talk of the town like a new trend in this month’s edition of Cosmo, but its roots run deep and can be traced back hundreds of years. In a famous English case, Sir Edward Coke stated: “[T]he house of every one is to him as his . . . castle and fortress, as well for his defence against injury and violence, as for his repose . . . .”

Even more renowned on this side of the pond, the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution reads:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Although the entire Fourth Amendment is comprised of one fifty-four-word sentence, courts are still trying to sift through the words in an attempt to discern how much protection the amendment provides, and to whom it provides, even those agreed upon protections. The Framers did not provide us much guidance in analyzing these very important words. As there are no explicit definitions or limitations helpfully appended to the text, constitutional interpretation is therefore left up to lawyers, lay-persons, judges, and justices alike. Thousands of hours have been devoted to the

63. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. IV (prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures).
65. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
66. Id.
67. See Jeffrey Bellin, Fourth Amendment Textualism, 118 MICH. L. REV. 233, 233 (2019) (attempting to find solutions for “the Fourth Amendment ‘search’ conundrums that continue to beguile the Court”);
Trevor Burrus & James Knight, Katz Nipped and Katz Cradled: Carpenter and the Evolving Fourth Amendment, 2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 79, 79, 82 (2017–2018) (discussing “the Evolving Fourth Amendment” and the need “to help delineate when the Fourth Amendment has been triggered”).
68. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Framers’ Intent: John Adams, His Era, and the Fourth Amendment, 86 IND. L.J. 979, 979–80 (2011) (suggesting the route to a meaningful interpretation of the Fourth Amendment is through John Adams’s “knowledge of, and views on, search and seizure and his role in formulating the principles to regulate those governmental actions” since he was the primary contributor to the Amendment).
69. See Bellin, supra note 67, at 233 (“Unfortunately, no viable alternatives appear on the horizon. The justices themselves offer little in the way of a replacement to Fourth Amendment
meaning of these words, and thousands of pages of discussion and debate exist exploring the intricacies—and yet, it seems we are lifetimes away from figuring it out under the best-case scenario.70

B. The Issue of Consent

One thing is fairly clear, though—the right to privacy is not absolute.71 Notwithstanding the above-listed issues,72 which are discussed further in Section III,73 consent can also be an affirmative defense to a claim of invasion of privacy.74 Consent is “[a] voluntary yielding to what another proposes or desires; agreement, approval, or permission regarding some act or purpose, especially given voluntarily by a competent person; legally effective assent.”75 Furthermore, consent may be express: clearly and unmistakably stated by the individual76—or it may be implied: inferred from the conduct of the individual.77

To further muddy the waters, the level of consent required for recordings depends on the jurisdiction in question: in some states, all parties need to consent to a recording, whereas federal law and a majority of states require consent of only one party.78 In situations in which only one party’s consent is required, some would purport that the owner or purchaser has consented

interpretation]. And scholars’ proposals exhibit the same complexity, subjectivity, and illegitimacy that pervade the status quo.” (emphasis omitted).

70. See Clancy, supra note 68, at 983 ("Historical analysis remains a fundamentally important tool to interpret the words of the Fourth Amendment. Despite its crucial role, there is no consensus regarding the details or meaning of the historical record."). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 760 (1994) (criticizing the inconsistent interpretations of the Fourth Amendment).


72. See discussion, supra, Section III(A) (mentioning, briefly, the issues of Fourth Amendment interpretation).

73. See discussion, supra, Section III(C) (delving into the varying interpretations of the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment).


75. Id.


77. Implied Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).

to the recording, but this is not a black and white matter.\textsuperscript{79} When would consent occur, if it did at all? Would it be when a person buys the device, when they accept it as a gift, when turning it on, by leaving the assistant turned on or plugged in, when the assistant wakes, or if and when the person notices that it wakes? Since there is no express agreement between the user and the smart device and the duration of consent is not specified, the answer to this question is far from clear.\textsuperscript{80}

Another issue rears its ugly head when visitors to a location speak, and Alexa records the speech, unbeknownst to them.\textsuperscript{81} It has been suggested that third parties should enjoy a reasonable expectation of privacy in this situation\textsuperscript{82}—and hopefully courts agree. If courts were to rule that the third parties have consented, there is a lot of grey area as to when that alleged consent may have occurred.\textsuperscript{83} Considerations include, but are not limited to: awareness of the presence of the device,\textsuperscript{84} awareness that the device is listening,\textsuperscript{85} awareness that the device is recording and full understanding of the specific recording procedures,\textsuperscript{86} awareness if the owner has their Alexa


\textsuperscript{80.} See Smith, supra note 60, at 205–08 (addressing some of the contractual consent dilemmas surrounding virtual assistants).

\textsuperscript{81.} See id. at 207 (differentiating visitors’ consent from that of purchasers).

\textsuperscript{82.} See Davidian, supra note 34, at 63 (“Considering the Court’s willingness to find reasonable expectations of privacy with regard to activity taking place within homes, unless and until Alexa becomes customary and prevalent in homes, third parties without knowledge that Alexa was within their vicinity should have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their conversations under the Fourth Amendment.”) (footnote omitted).

\textsuperscript{83.} See Bohm et al., supra note 17, at 19–20, 29 (providing hypotheticals illustrating the uncertain nature of consent of third-party visitors); Davidian, supra note 34, at 61–62 (discussing consent issues with the assistants).

\textsuperscript{84.} See Bohm et al., supra note 17, at 19–20, 29 (stressing visitors to a home or business containing a virtual assistant may not even be aware of its presence).

\textsuperscript{85.} See id. at 16 (noting the smart “devices . . . are not marketed with sufficient information to enable consumers to understand and develop reasonable expectations about how the devices function—and when they are listening”).

\textsuperscript{86.} See id. at 16, 19–20, 29 (emphasizing visitors’ potential lack of knowledge about virtual assistants’ recording); Smith, supra note 60, at 207 (differentiating visitors’ consent from purchasers’ consent); Davidian, supra note 34, at 60 (hypothesizing there may be a day in the near future when all visitors to a home will understand they may be recorded by the assistants).
settings such that the recordings are sent to Amazon for quality control, whether the speaker activated the device intentionally, and whether the speaker was a minor or had reached the age of majority.

A class action was recently brought under the California Invasion of Privacy Act “on behalf of a proposed class of ‘all citizens of the State of California who used a household Amazon Alexa device while they were minors, but who have not downloaded and installed the Alexa app.’” In most cases, contractual agreements with minors are “voidable at the option of the minor” even if the minor has expressly agreed to the unspeakably long laundry lists of terms and conditions. So why should they be bound to the chains of consent with recordings? They should not—but we will see how this shakes out in the coming years, especially with the recent innovation of the rainbow-ridden kids edition of the Echo Dot.

C. Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

Among the ambiguous language in the Fourth Amendment is the phrase “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Although it may initially seem elementary, questions soon arise such as: what acts are deemed to be unreasonable, what is a search, and what is a seizure?

88. See Boughman et al., supra note 50, at 2 (discussing the potential for accidental engagement of the assistant).
89. See Smith, supra note 60, at 218 (discussing potential violations of children’s privacy laws by the virtual assistants).
91. Exceptions exist, such as if “the minor . . . [fails to] disaffirm the entire contract within a reasonable time of reaching the age of majority.” Juanda Lowder Daniel, Virtually Mature: Examining the Policy of Minors’ Incapacity to Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 239, 244 (2007).
92. See id. at 244 (“Currently, most if not all jurisdictions allow a minor to disaffirm a contract made while he was under the age of majority solely based on his status as a minor.”).
94. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
95. See Julia R. Shackleton, Alexa, Amazon Assistant or Government Informant?, 27 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 301, 310–11 (2019) (stating “[t]hroughout the course of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the United States Supreme Court has varied in its interpretation of what the Fourth Amendment protects”—providing examples from Justices Harlan’s focus on the “subjective expectation of privacy” to Justices Taft’s and Scalia’s property or trespass-based notions of an unreasonable search).
Dictionary defines “unreasonable” as: “1. Not guided by reason; irrational or capricious. 2. Not supported by a valid exception to the warrant requirement.” A “search,” as it pertains to criminal procedure, is “[a]n examination of a person’s body, property, or other area that the person would reasonably be expected to consider as private, conducted by a law-enforcement officer for the purpose of finding evidence of a crime.” The definition also echoes the Fourth Amendment’s probable cause requirement nested in the Warrants clause. Lastly, a “seizure” is “[t]he act or an instance of taking possession of a person or property by legal right or process; esp[ecially], in constitutional law, a confiscation or arrest that may interfere with a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.”

Although the government has historically had a reputation for being the overreaching “Big Brother,” sometimes it is valuable to have the right sort of big brother to look out for your interests. On June 30, 1965, President Lyndon B. Johnson issued a memorandum addressing the wiretapping of telephones and the resulting invasions of privacy—urging these practices only be conducted in circumstances implicating a breach of national security. What he went on to say was even more wise and insightful, far ahead of his time, and echoes principles that should be adhered to today regarding virtual assistants:

Utilization of . . . electronic devices to overhear non-telephone conversations is an even more difficult problem, which raises substantial and unresolved questions of [c]onstitutional interpretation. I desire that each agency conducting such investigations . . . ascertain whether the agency’s practices are

98. Id.
99. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
100. See Warrant Clause, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“The clause of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requiring that warrants be issued only on probable cause.”).
102. See Kenneth Shuster, Stunting Big Brother’s Growth: Reflections on U.S. v. U.S. District Court, 18 HAMLINE L. REV. 64 (1994) (“[R]eexamine[ing] one of the most important Supreme Court cases to address governmental electronic eavesdropping . . . .”.
104. Id.
fully in accord with the law and with a decent regard for the rights of others.105

Two years later, in the landmark case of *Katz v. United States*,106 the Supreme Court held the defendant, Katz, was protected from the warrantless eavesdropping by the government via a device placed outside the phone booth he was using as Katz had “justifiably relied” upon the privacy of the telephone booth.107

Shortly thereafter came Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, more commonly known as the Wiretap Act.108 The Act prohibits unlawful seizure “of wire, oral, or electronic communications” by governmental and private agencies or individuals.109 Although “[e]lectronic surveillance [has been said to be] an essential law enforcement tool,”110 the digital assistants are recording and transmitting data unchecked, and therefore without probable cause.111 It follows, then, that the limitations on how this collected data can be used must be at least as stringent, if not more so, than the constitutional, statutory, and common-law restrictions regarding wiretapping.112

Although Facebook has been complying with state and federal requests for Facebook users’ data for years,113 courts should find data from virtual assistants distinguishable. Even when a person directly and intentionally asks a virtual assistant a question, they do not have the same intent to publish that information as those who post on Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and other forms of social media. In order “[f]or a conveyance

105. *Id.*
107. *Id.* at 353.
109. *Id.*
111. See Bohm et al., *supra* note 17, at 20–22 (arguing for the probable cause standard for access to always-on device information as this is not currently occurring).
112. See 47 U.S.C. § 605 (providing federal limitations on wiretapping); Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 101 (1957) (holding neither participation nor knowledge by federal agents is required in order for the evidence obtained through wiretapping to be inadmissible in court); Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 378, 381–82 (1968) (holding “continuous surreptitious surveillance and recording of all conversations” without consent “clearly amounted to interception of the petitioners’ communications within the meaning of § 605 of the Federal Communications Act”).
to be made voluntarily, it must be done with intent or by design, which, of course, presumes knowledge on the part of the consumer of that which is being conveyed.” This level of awareness is not yet commonplace with always-on devices.

For this reason, the Florida Bar Association issued a Formal Ethics Opinion creating a process to ensure compliance with their local ethics rules regarding the use of smart devices and virtual assistants—the rationale behind the opinion being “that many lawyers were ‘intentionally and unintentionally stor[ing] their clients’ information on these [d]evices.” If highly-educated professionals struggle with unintentional recordings and data storage by the virtual assistants, one can safely assume the dilemma does not stop there. Even more clearly deserving of protection, though, are the individuals inadvertently recorded due to an error in voice recognition by Alexa or her friends.

Looking at recent case law regarding other digital intrusions can provide guidance in this matter. For instance, in a case wherein the police discovered a man, Kyllo, was growing marijuana indoors by aiming a thermal imager at his residence, the Supreme Court held that any information obtained from within the home that would ordinarily not have been accessible without physical intrusion, or without technology that is not in general public use, constituted a search. The Court reemphasized “that the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house’” when it prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures. In the 2014 case of Riley v. California, two defendants were arrested and the digital contents of their cell phones were searched. The Court deemed this was unconstitutional

115. See Bohm et al., supra note 17, at 5, 16, 19–20, 29 (“[I]t is often unclear to consumers what kinds of data these [always-on] devices are collecting, when they are collecting that data, and what companies are really doing with the data.”).
117. See id. (describing the ethical hoops attorneys are navigating in the virtual assistant arena).
118. See discussion supra Section II.
119. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001) (“Where, as here, the Government uses a device that is not in general public use, to explore details of a private home that would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a Fourth Amendment ‘search,’ and is presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”).
120. Id. at 40 (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980)).
122. See id. at 376–81 (describing the arrests and subsequent searches and seizures of David Riley and Brima Wurie in each of their respective cases).
without a warrant. The Court reasoned that due to the colossal storage capability of cell phones—often containing multiple years of sensitive data—an invasion of this variety is much more severe than physical searches of decades past. As the Court stated, “many of the more than 90% of American adults who own cell phones keep on their person a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives.”

Furthermore, in the 2011 case of *Carpenter v. United States*, the Court arguably had excellent statutory reason to allow captured, warrantless evidence, but saw the following facts as crucial in finding otherwise. After a series of robberies, several men were arrested in conjunction with the same, and one of the men detained eventually disclosed they had robbed many other locations and disclosed the names of his accomplices. Upon obtaining this information, the court orders were sought—and granted—under the Stored Communications Act to obtain cell phone records for the accused. The Stored Communications Act allows the government to compel certain communications records when there is reasonable cause to show the records are relevant and probative in an ongoing criminal investigation.

The Court held the government obtaining the Defendant’s cell-site location information (CSLI) violated his reasonable expectation of privacy, despite having obtained the data from a third party under a court order. In doing so, it reasoned:

Given the unique nature of cell phone location records, the fact that the information is held by a third party does not by itself overcome the user’s

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123. See id. at 403 (“Our answer to the question of what police must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a warrant.”).
124. See id. at 375 (noting, prior to “cell phones, a search of a person was limited by physical realities and generally constituted only a narrow intrusion on privacy,” but that in the modern world, a wealth of private information can be gathered from these devices).
125. Id.
127. See id. at 2211 (“This case presents the question whether the Government conducts a search under the Fourth Amendment when it accesses historical cell phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past movements.”).
128. Id. at 2212.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See id. at 2219 (“In mechanically applying the third-party doctrine to this case, the Government fails to appreciate that there are no comparable limitations on the revealing nature of CSLI.”).
claim to Fourth Amendment protection. Whether the Government employs its own surveillance technology as in Jones or leverages the technology of a wireless carrier, we hold that an individual maintains a legitimate expectation of privacy in the record of his physical movements as captured through CSLI. The location information obtained from Carpenter’s wireless carriers was the product of a search.132

Although perhaps less obviously, the recording and repetition of speech by the virtual assistants is akin to the listening and repetition of speech by parrots.133 In both situations, an eavesdropper of sorts repeats back information it overheard and was not expected to disclose. Courts have refused to admit such instances of testimony by parrots—despite parrots being regarded as highly reliable testimony from intelligent animals—for a number of reasons. In one case, a parrot named Max repeatedly cried out, “Richard, no, no, no!” after the murder of his owner, Jane Gill.134 The defense attorney in the case wanted to have this evidence admitted because his client’s name was Gary.135 The attorney said it was not hearsay, but instead that it was akin to a recording device.136 However, the Judge denied admission of the parrot’s statement, despite expert testimony that this type of parrot has the ability to accurately repeat statements—even in similarly stressful circumstances.137

Similarly, Bud, the parrot, began incessantly repeating, “Don’t f***ing shoot!” after the murder of Martin Duram by Glenna Duram.138 A parrot from South Carolina comparably repeated, “help me, help me,” which had

132. See Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2217 (stating, under exigent circumstances, CSLI data could foreseeably be lawfully obtained without a warrant).
134. Parrot May Have the Answer to a Killing, supra note 133.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Coble, supra note 133.
been cried out by its owner, Anne Copeland, prior to her death. Even more heart-wrenchingly, the parrot also laughed, mimicking the laugh of Ms. Copeland’s murderer.\footnote{139} There has been a push by the Nonhuman Rights Project for recognition of “certain ‘cognitively complex’ animals as ‘persons’ rather than ‘things’.”\footnote{140} However, apparently their time has not come yet. Given this fact, that cognitively complex animals are still recognized as “things” and the recollections and resulting repetitions of “things” cannot be submitted as evidence in a case,\footnote{141} virtual assistants should not be any exception to that rule.

Traveling back in time, the court in\footnote{142}\textit{Dietemann v. Time},\footnote{143} hit the nail on the head when it held that the defendant infringed upon Dietemann’s privacy rights by obtaining and publishing information about, and recordings of, the plaintiff without his consent.\footnote{144} The court eloquently reasoned:

\begin{quote}
Plaintiff’s den was a sphere from which he could reasonably expect to exclude eavesdropping newsmen. He invited two of defendant’s employees to the den. One who invites another to his home or office takes a risk that the visitor may not be what he seems, and that the visitor may repeat all he hears and observes when he leaves. But he does not and should not be required to take the risk that what is heard and seen will be transmitted by photograph or recording, or in our modern world, in full living color and hi-fi to the public at large or to any segment of it that the visitor may select. A different rule could have a most pernicious effect upon the dignity of man and it would surely lead to guarded conversations and conduct where candor is most valued, e.g., in the case of doctors and lawyers.\footnote{144}
\end{quote}

D. \textit{The Smart “Home Away from Home”}

Although many people tend to consider smart home devices as home accessories, hence their name, these devices also are finding their place in

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{139} Roth, \textit{supra} note 133.
\item \footnote{141} Id.
\item \footnote{142} Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
\item \footnote{143} See \textit{id.} at 248 (stating a person does not waive their privacy rights by inviting someone into their home).
\item \footnote{144} \textit{Id.} at 249.
\end{itemize}
the professional world—including in law firms and doctors’ offices. As the Dietemann court predicted, this further illustrates the need for the above-mentioned privacy issues connected with virtual assistants to be adequately addressed. Amazon has now developed Alexa for Business, which allows the user to keep track of billable hours, inter alia. Additionally, Thompson Reuters has released its own Workplace Assistant. However, with digital assistants on the rise, professionals will have to consider the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and applicable jurisdictional rules.

E. Evidentiary Considerations

Some argue that digital assistants be used as so-called silent witnesses. The silent witness theory is one in which a human witness is not required to substantiate an act occurred, but instead recordings specifically noted as photographs or videotapes are admitted as substantive evidence and do not require a sponsoring witness. Taking no specific qualms with the silent witness doctrine generally, the digital assistants should not be included

145. See Beahm & Bowman, supra note 8, at 58 (discussing home and office use of the virtual assistants); Rise and Danger of Virtual Assistants, supra note 38, at 1 (“Virtual assistants processing and retaining your interactions in the Cloud raises privacy concerns and potentially creates a discoverable and admissible record with each use.”); Robert D. Lang & Lenore E. Benessere, Virtual Assistants in the Workplace: Real, Not Virtual Pitfalls and Privacy Concerns, 21 J. INTERNET L. 1, 4 (2018) [hereinafter Virtual Assistants in the Workplace] (“Not surprisingly, as Alexa and other virtual assistants continue to increase in popularity, we are beginning to see them in both homes and businesses. If a virtual assistant is a luxury at home, then certainly, it is a necessity at work.”).

146. Dietemann, 449 F.2d at 249.

147. See discussion supra Sections II–IV.

148. See generally Alexa for Business, AMAZON WEB SERVS., https://aws.amazon.com/alexaforbusiness/ [https://perma.cc/B7VH-A49A] (discussing various professional applications of the Alexa for Business product). See Virtual Assistants in the Workplace, supra note 139, at 3–4 (discussing the Alexa for Business platform); Wojkowski, supra note 49 (drawing attention to systems designed to bring Alexa into the legal workplace).

149. See Wojkowski, supra note 49 (providing another example of a legal system which can be utilized through Alexa).

150. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2018) (laying guidelines for attorney competence); id. R. 1.6 (establishing guidelines for confidentiality of information).


under this theory for several reasons: (1) their recordings and transcriptions are not photographs or videotapes; (2) the digital assistants are so pervasive in society at this point that they are practically unavoidable; and (3) the activation or waking technology is far from perfect. Photographs and videotapes are much more time-honored types of recorded evidence. Therefore, it follows they should be more reliable than digital assistants. Even if a court were to rule that they should be considered silent witnesses, the privilege extension to the digital assistants should still apply to confidential communications, but only to the extent permitted under the applicable state and federal rules.

To illustrate, there is an investigation underway in Hallandale Beach, Florida, wherein police believe recordings captured by Alexa may help them get to the bottom of a woman’s death. Sylvia Galva Crespo and her husband were arguing and, somehow, she was stabbed in the chest. Should the court find that Alexa’s recordings of the altercation, if any, are admissible under a silent witness theory? The recordings would likely still be admissible under the proposed privilege extension. Under the Florida Evidence Code, there is a Husband-Wife Privilege codified as Section 90.504. However, similar to the Texas Spousal Privilege rule, there is no privilege in a criminal proceeding where one of the spouses is charged with committing a crime against the other spouse. Therefore, although the privilege extension should be adopted as a general rule, the communications would not be considered privileged on account of the statutory exception.

There are many other evidentiary issues to be considered including whether, under the Federal Rules of Evidence and those of the applicable

153. See Christopher B. Burkett, Note, “I Call Alexa to the Stand”: The Privacy Implications of Anthropomorphizing Virtual Assistants Accompanying Smart-Home Technology, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1181, 1182 (2018) (discussing the pervasive nature of smart-home technology); Stucke & Ezrachi, supra note 2, at 1286 (“The Court cited one 2013 poll where ‘nearly three-quarters of smartphone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12 percent admitting that they even use their phones in the shower.’”) (citation omitted).
154. See discussion infra Section II.
155. See discussion infra Section IV.
156. See Alexa, Did He Do It?, supra note 151 (“Police in Florida are investigating whether they have stumbled on a silent witness to a possible murder and are trying to get the truth from ‘her.’”).
157. See id. (putting forth the facts and the unknowns of the tragic Hallandale Beach case).
158. F LA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504 (West 2020).
159. TEX. R. EVID. 504(b)(1).
160. F LA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504; TEX. R. EVID. 504(b)(1).
161. F LA. STAT. ANN. § 90.504; TEX. R. EVID. 504.
state, the proffered evidence from the digital assistant would also (1) be unfairly prejudicial;162 (2) be inadmissible hearsay;163 (3) not be able to be properly authenticated;164 or (4) fail to satisfy the personal knowledge requirement.165 Furthermore, the prosecution would have to lay the proper foundation for the evidence, including: “the competency of the operator, the fidelity of the recording equipment, the absence of material deletions, additions, or alterations in the relevant portions of the recording, and the identification of the relevant speakers.”166

F. The Privilege

Rule 501 of the Federal and Texas Rules of Evidence discuss legal privileges in general.167 Federal Rule 501 was codified by Congress in order to give deference to the courts as to what may be construed as legally privileged communications.168 The current privileges recognized by Texas and federal courts, either by statute, case law, or both, include: required reports privileged,169 attorney-client privilege,170 physician-patient privilege,171 psychotherapist/social worker-client privilege,172 spousal confidential communication privilege,173 spousal testimonial privilege,174 clergyman-penitent privilege,175 political vote privilege,176 trade secrets

162. FED. R. EVID. 403; TEX. R. EVID. 403.
164. FED. R. EVID. 901; TEX. R. EVID. 901.
165. FED. R. EVID. 602; TEX. R. EVID. 602.
166. See United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1977) (providing the foundation for introducing sound recording evidence).
168. See David A. Schlueter, Do We Need a Parent-Child Privilege?, 2 CRIM. JUST. 10, 37 (1987) (discussing legal arguments for and against creating new privileges).
169. TEX. R. EVID. 502.
170. FED. R. EVID. 502; TEX. R. EVID. 503.
171. TEX. R. EVID. 509.
172. TEX. R. EVID. 510.
173. TEX. R. EVID. 504(a).
174. TEX. R. EVID. 504(b).
175. TEX. R. EVID. 505.
176. TEX. R. EVID. 506.
Some of the above-mentioned privacy implications were discussed in “I Call Alexa to the Stand”: The Privacy Implications of Anthropomorphizing Virtual Assistants Accompanying Smart-Home Technology. In a latter portion of the Note, it is suggested courts (1) treat the digital assistants as “persons” and (2) create a new privilege for the digital assistants.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Although the suggestion of a personal assistant privilege is understandable—and even tempting—a slightly different approach should be taken for several reasons. First, despite the Court’s ability to honor new privileges, it has been historically reluctant to do so. Creating new privileges can result in a slippery slope and, for this reason, few have been added beyond the original common-law privileges. No independent privilege exists for accountants, but the attorney-client privilege has been

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177. TEX. R. EVID. 507.
179. TEX. R. EVID. 508.
181. See generally Burkett, supra note 153, at 1181 (discussing privacy concerns surrounding digital assistants).
182. See id. at 1206–10 (stating “[c]ourts have the capacity to define how to treat virtual assistant technology and should extend the term ‘person’ to certain technologies that are subjected to assignments of agency” and describing various approaches of accomplishing this via either common-law or statutory modification).
183. See id. at 1210–16 (suggesting solutions to privacy issues with digital assistants by offering an extensive “ privilege between man and machine”—whether under the “instrumental model” or “the humanistic model”).
184. See id. at 1213 (noting an Alexa-user privilege is necessary to avoid “a chilling effect on communications between these parties, thus defeating the relationship’s fundamental purpose.”).
185. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980) (“The Federal Rules of Evidence acknowledge the authority of the federal courts to continue the evolutionary development of testimonial privileges in federal criminal trials ‘governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted . . . in the light of reason and experience.’”).
186. See Schluer, supra note 168, at 11 (explaining courts generally disfavor evidentiary privileges “because they potentially block otherwise relevant evidence”).
187. See id. at 37 (weighing the arguments for and against various privileges).
extended to accountants in some circumstances. If a personal assistant privilege were to be created, we might soon have nanny, coworker, and best friend privileges on the horizon. It may initially sound absurd at first read, but it would not be a far stretch to see requests for such privileges emerge if new privileges are created for various relationships.

There are a few ways in which to protect the sanctity of these conversations made in the presence of a virtual assistant:

A. An Extension of the Existing Privileges

We should take steps to solve this problem by giving holders and claimants of the respective, existing privileges with the ability to extend the respective, existing privileges to the virtual assistants. The creators of smart home devices have already posited the assistants can be an extension of the user:

Home. It’s more than just four walls and a roof over your head. It’s where you feel safest and most comfortable. But what if your home knew you as well as you know it? What if it could recognize you, and anticipate your needs? . . . What if your home became—in small ways, then big ones—an extension of you?189

This recommendation seeks to prevent virtual assistants from effectively “testifying” as to what was heard and recorded. This could either be accomplished by the Court adopting this method of analysis at common-law, by the Rules regarding privilege to be updated individually to reflect the same, or by the Rules Committee adding another Rule which would limit the former by this new exception.

The basic premise of this proposal is neither unheard of nor unprecedented. As mentioned, the attorney-client privilege has been extended to accountants in some circumstances. Translators are

188. See generally United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d Cir. 1961) (extending the attorney-client privilege to accountants hired by the attorney or client under certain circumstances).


190. See generally Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958) (reiterating the common-law rule preventing spouses from testifying against one another); see also Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223 (1839) (holding a wife could not testify against her husband even though he had died).

191. See Kovel, 296 F.2d at 922 (“Hence the presence of an accountant, whether hired by the lawyer or by the client, while the client is relating a complicated tax story to the lawyer, ought not...
permitted to be present during privileged conversations without violating the privilege, as are employees of attorneys and doctors under the proper circumstances. For generations, husbands and wives were prohibited from testifying against their respective spouses; they were considered legally incompetent to do so. The common-law reasoning was for the sake of “fostering the harmony and sanctity of the marriage relationship.” After all—as romantically phrased by the Supreme Court in Stein v. Bowman—marriage has long been considered “the best solace of human existence.”

In Trammel v. United States, the tides turned and spouses have since been allowed to testify against one another if they so choose. The reasoning behind this decision largely fell on the argument that the spousal “relationship is almost certainly in disrepair [if one spouse would testify against the other]; there is probably little in the way of marital harmony for

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192. See id. at 921 (explaining several situations in which attorneys may have linguists present to best assist a client).

193. See id. (“On the other hand, in contrast to the Tudor times when the privilege was first recognized, . . . the complexities of modern existence prevent attorneys from effectively handling clients’ affairs without the help of others; few lawyers could now practice without the assistance of secretaries, file clerks, telephone operators, messengers, clerks not yet admitted to the bar, and aides of other sorts. ‘The assistance of these agents being indispensable to his work and the communications of the client being often necessarily committed to them by the attorney or by the client himself, the privilege must include all the persons who act as the attorney’s agents.’” (quoting 8 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2301; Annot., 53 A.L.R. 369 (1928))) (internal citation omitted).

194. Hawkins, 358 U.S. at 75.

195. See id. (“The common-law rule, accepted at an early date as controlling in this country, was that husband and wife were incompetent as witnesses for or against each other.”); Stein, 38 U.S. at 222–23 (“And it is conceived that this principle [of spousal incompetency to testify against one another in court] does not merely afford protection to the husband and wife, which they are at liberty to invoke or not, at their discretion, when the question is propounded; but it renders them incompetent to disclose facts in evidence in violation of the rule. And it is well that the principle does not rest on the discretion of the parties. If it did, in most instances it would afford no substantial protection to persons uninstructed in their rights, and thrown off their guard and embarrassed by searching interrogatories.”).


197. Stein, 38 U.S. at 223.


199. See id. at 53 (“Accordingly, we conclude that the existing rule should be modified so that the witness-spouse alone has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness may be neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying. This modification—vesting the privilege in the witness-spouse—furthers the important public interest in marital harmony without unduly burdening legitimate law enforcement needs.”).
the privilege to preserve. However, this sad circumstance is not applicable with regard to the above examples of testimony by the virtual assistants. In the virtual assistant scenarios mentioned, the claimants and holders of the various privileges do not seek to violate one another’s confidence. So why should we allow six-inch tall towers or rectangular prisms in our pockets to be forced to disclose these privileged conversations? We should not. If individuals seek to uphold the privileges granted them by common-law or the Texas and Federal Rules of Evidence, Alexa should not stand in their way.

By taking this initiative, the Court could avoid creating a new privilege, as is its preference, yet enable people engaging in otherwise privileged speech to feel comfortable around smart speakers. This would promote further technological advancement rather than fear of the same:

As Justice Brandeis explained in his famous dissent, the Court is obligated—as “[s]ubtler and more far-reaching means of invading privacy have become available to the Government”—to ensure that the “progress of science” does not erode Fourth Amendment protections.

Undoubtedly, privacy is not absolute, as “the government is permitted to limit that interest if it can demonstrate a compelling government interest and that its means of limitation or intrusion are necessary and closely tailored to meeting that interest.” However, privileged conversations, such as pillow talk between spouses and confidential discussions between attorneys and their clients or doctors and their patients, should not be at risk.

B. Creating a “Castle” Privilege?

Should the Court be open to the idea of creating a new privilege in addition to prohibiting the virtual assistants from testifying as mentioned

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200. Id. at 52.
201. See id. (noting the marriage was already in such a state of disrepair since Trammel’s wife was willing to testify against him in exchange for lenient treatment).
202. See Schlueter, supra note 168, at 11 (stating “the general principle that evidentiary privileges are generally disfavored”).
204. See Schlueter, supra note 168, at 13 (illuminating flaws in the syllogism adopted by proponents of the parent-child privilege).
205. See discussion supra Section IV(A).
above, the Court should create a so-called “castle” privilege. The proposed title to this privilege was inspired by the following quote by Sir Edward Coke: “every man’s house is his castle, and he ought to keep and defend it at his peril; and if any one be robbed in his house, it shall be esteemed his own default and negligence.”

I propose this castle privilege would only protect recordings within the home in circumstances where one has a legitimate expectation of privacy. Specifically, it would not apply in the home if individuals other than one’s spouse were present since one would have no legitimate expectation of privacy under these circumstances. Circumstances in which the speech would be protected by the castle privilege, were it to be adopted, would include when the individual was at home, speaking aloud—whether to the personal assistant intentionally or if the assistant was recording unbeknownst to the individual.

This is likewise not unprecedented. Looking back at Kyllo v. United States, any information obtained from within the home which would ordinarily not have been accessible without physical intrusion, or without technology not in general public use, constituted a search. Although many people now have at least one virtual assistant, it is the smart device itself that is available to the general public—not the remote listening and recording, or subsequent cloud transmission and cloud verification technologies. The castle privilege would be consistent under Kyllo but would extend explicitly to the virtual assistants.

206. See discussion supra Section IV(A).
209. See Christi Olson & Kelli Kemerer, Microsoft, Voice Report From Answers to Action: Customer Adoption of Voice Technology and Digital Assistants 14 (2019), https://advertiseonbing-blob.azureedge.net/blob/bingads/media/insight/whitepapers/2019/04%20april/voice-report/bingads_2019_voicereport.pdf [https://perma.cc/H9SY-YTVF] (“Gartner predicts that by 2020, 75% of households will have at least one smart speaker. By January 2019, we saw that 45% already own a smart speaker. For many survey respondents, one was not enough. 41% of respondents who own a smart speaker already have multiple speakers (2+)” (footnote omitted).
210. See id. at 15 (reminding us it is important to remember “[t]his is just the beginning” and even “voice and digital assistants are still in very early stages of adoption”).
V.  CONCLUSION

Therefore, the existing privileges should be extended to the digital assistants—based on a lack of competency as was rooted in common law for public policy reasons—and a “castle” privilege should exist in a person’s home when she has a legitimate and reasonable expectation of privacy.212

The aforementioned issues are becoming ever more prevalent as digital assistants are nearly unavoidable.213 A digital assistant could be lurking in the pocket of someone you are talking to, in a business office you visit, or in a conference room during a supposedly confidential proceeding.214 Given the imperfection of the waking or activation technology, these devices may be triggered inadvertently and send privileged and private conversations to the cloud for review by Amazon workers if the setting is not disabled.215 For these reasons and more, current lack of protection and privacy in the presence of the digital assistants is something we can no longer tolerate.

Their present ability to disclose privileged conversations216 is contrary to the reasoning behind privileges in the state and Federal Rules of Evidence. Even in the most severe criminal cases, compelling one spouse to testify against the other is forbidden, with just a few exceptions,217 because it is deemed to be in the interest of public policy to promote the institution of marriage.218 Digital assistants should not have the ability, nor the privilege, to disclose these privileged conversations.

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212. See discussion supra Sections IV(A); see discussion supra Sections II(B).
213. See discussion supra Sections II–IV. See generally OLSON & KEMERY, supra note 209 (evaluating “customer adoption of voice technology and digital assistants”).
214. See generally Ian Samuel, The New Writs of Assistance, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2884–85 (2018) (illustrating how virtual assistants are becoming more widely used, both in the professional world and in private use).
216. See Hosey, supra note 11, at 59 (“Assurances that information from privileged client meetings will not be disclosed would be difficult to achieve with always-on technologies like Alexa or Siri present.”).
217. See TEX. R. EVID. 504; Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 217 (1839) (“This rule is subject to some exceptions, as when the husband commits an offence against the person of his wife.”).
218. See Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 78 (1958) (“Adverse testimony given in criminal proceedings would, we think, be likely to destroy almost any marriage.”); Stein, 38 U.S. at 223 (forbidding a widow from testifying against her then-deceased husband).