Municipal Annexation Reform in Texas: How a Victory for Property Rights Jeopardizes the State’s Financial Health

Julie Polansky Bell

St. Mary's University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal

Part of the Law and Politics Commons, Law and Society Commons, Legal Remedies Commons, Legislation Commons, Property Law and Real Estate Commons, Public Policy Commons, State and Local Government Law Commons, Taxation-State and Local Commons, Urban Studies Commons, and the Urban Studies and Planning Commons

Recommended Citation


Available at: https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss2/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the St. Mary's Law Journals at Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. It has been accepted for inclusion in St. Mary's Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Commons at St. Mary's University. For more information, please contact sfowler@stmarytx.edu, jcrane3@stmarytx.edu.
COMMENT

MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION REFORM IN TEXAS: HOW A VICTORY FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS JEOPARDIZES THE STATE’S FINANCIAL HEALTH

JULIE POLANSKY BELL*

I. Introduction ........................................................................................... 712
II. Background ............................................................................................ 714
   A. Municipal Annexation in the United States ....................................... 714
   B. Initial Development of Municipal Annexation Laws in Texas ....... 717
   C. Evolution of Modern Annexation Laws ........................................ 719
III. Legislative History of the Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act .................................................................................. 721
IV. The Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act ........................................ 723
   A. Tier 1 and Tier 2 MunicipalityDefinitions ...................................... 723
   B. Tier 2 Municipality Annexation Authority ...................................... 724
   C. Tier 2 Municipality Annexation on Request of Owners .............. 724
   D. Tier 2 Municipality Annexation of an Area with a Population Less Than 200 ............................................................ 725
   E. Tier 2 Municipality Annexation of an Area with a Population More than 200 ............................................................ 726

* St. Mary’s University School of Law, J.D., 2019. The author would like to thank her parents for their unconditional love and support, friends and family for their constant encouragement, and the St. Mary’s Law Journal Editorial Board and all members of Volume 50. Most importantly, the author would like to thank her husband, Eric, for his patience, inspiration, and humor throughout the completion of this Comment and the author’s legal studies.
I. INTRODUCTION

“Can we ever get away from the sprawl?”1 This question has concerned American city leaders for decades.2 Municipal annexation—the expansion of city boundaries—helps to combat the devastating effects caused by suburban flight and sprawl.3 Beginning in the early 1900s, Texas cities had broad annexation authority4 and many utilized this power to develop into the flourishing metropolises that they are today.5 Annexation is a contentious issue though, and ignites property owners and their state

---

1. ARCADE FIRE, Sprawl II (Mountains Beyond Mountains), on THE SUBURBS (Merge Records 2010).
2. See Eric S. Raymond & Charles E. Menifield, A Tale of Two Cities: An Exploratory Study of Consolidation and Annexation Policies in the Cities of Memphis and Nashville, 35 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 404, 418 (2011) (“[O]ver the past half century, central cities have faced increasing loss of its middle- to upper-income residents . . . .”).
3. See id. (identifying annexation as a way for cities to “curb [the] ever-growing urban crisis” caused by losing residents). The question of whether annexation is the best way to relieve municipal financial burdens is a complex question that is outside the scope of this comment. See Robert Rivard, City Counsel to Grapple Anew With Annexation Question, RIVARD REP. (June 10, 2016), https://therivardreport.com/city-council-to-grapple-anew-with-annexation-question/ [https://perma.cc/M37Z-D96R], for an example of financial analysis reports evaluating annexation plans in Bexar County.
4. Compare Act approved April 7, 1913, 33d Leg., R.S., ch. 147, § 4, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 307, 310–16 (repealed 1995) (providing a historic account of the broad authority of home rule cities to extend their boundaries), with TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 43.003 (designating three permissible actions available to home rule cities regarding their boundaries).
5. See TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, HOW CITIES WORK 35 (2017), https://www.tml.org/p/HowCitiesWork2017Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LH3-279D] (“States in which city councils decide whether to annex have seen their cities grow faster over the past [twenty-five] years, both economically and demographically, than other states that limit annexation.”). Over a fifty-year period, Houston increased by 440 square miles, San Antonio by 381 square miles, Dallas by 229 square miles, and Austin by 265 square miles. Id.
representatives. This controversy is reflected in the evolution of Texas annexation laws, which have been a continuous “balance of powers between property owners and municipalities” with property owners given more influence over time. The fight to erode broad municipal annexation authority in Texas came to an end during the eighty-fifth legislative session with the passing of the Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act (MARVA).

Under the new law in Texas, cities located in populous counties are severely limited in their ability to annex neighboring communities. This victory for private property rights may seem like good news for Texans living in fringe communities who are now safeguarded from paying city-imposed property taxes. However, the new law goes against urban researchers’ recommendations and may lead to detrimental financial consequences for municipalities, metropolitan regions, and the entire State of Texas. Although there are other tools available to help cities improve and maintain their security, Texas lawmakers will likely jeopardize the economic prosperity of Texas if they continue to strip away local government powers.

6. See id. at 34 (“Rural landowners and others have regularly turned to their legislators for relief from city expansions, with the result that bills to curb unilateral annexations have surfaced in every session for the past [forty] years.”).

7. H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 71 (2016).

8. See, e.g., Act of May 25, 1999, 76th Leg., R.S., ch. 1167, § 4, sec. 43.052(c), 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 4074, 4075 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 43.052(c)) (requiring cities to wait three years before annexing an area).


10. See id. §§ 24–26, secs. 43.066–0699, 4511–17 (requiring tier 2 municipalities to obtain consent from residents and property owners prior to annexation).


This comment begins by giving a background on municipal annexation in the United States and Texas, in Part II. Part III and IV discuss the legislative history and specific provisions of MARVA. Part V predicts the future implications related to annexation reform including cautioning state lawmakers from creating further restrictions on local government authority.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Municipal Annexation in the United States

Municipal annexation occurs when cities expand their boundaries and thereby increase in land area. Cities choose to acquire additional territory for a number of reasons, but the greatest motivator is maintaining and improving economic prosperity. Annexation was frequently used by American cities in the twentieth century, and is oftentimes a controversial issue for the communities being annexed. Involuntary municipal miracle ([https://perma.cc/CS97-JJ3Z](https://perma.cc/CS97-JJ3Z)) (asserting the “Texas Miracle” is overdue largely to state legislators’ preoccupation with issues other than the economy).


15. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 48 (2016) (“The purpose of annexation by municipalities is to create zoning and development standards, provide more efficient public safety and municipal services.”); PAULA F. STEINBAUER ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION IN GEORGIA AND THE UNITED STATES: A SEARCH FOR POLICY GUIDANCE 8–9 (Richard W. Campbell ed., 2002) (identifying “control [of] urban sprawl” and “broadening their political base” as potential motivations behind a municipality’s decision to annex).

16. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 48 (Tex. 2016) (“[A]nnexation gives municipalities the ability to maximize the return on investments (infrastructure and business incentives), protect and expand the tax base.”); Tyson, supra note 14, at 507 (recognizing that cities want to grow in size because it usually leads to “better employment opportunities . . . and higher property values”); Christopher J. Tyson, Localism and Involuntary Annexation: Reconsidering Approaches to New Regionalism, 87 TUL. L. REV. 297, 300 (2012) (discussing how municipal annexation allows cities to recapture taxes from wealthier residents who emigrated to the edge of the city boundaries).


18. See 22 DAVID B. BROOKS, TEXAS PRACTICE SERIES: MUNICIPAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.13 (2d ed. 2017) (“The unilateral annexation of territory by cities without voter approval is one of the more contentious issues of municipal law in Texas.”); Tyson, supra note 16, at 300 (noting there is “organized opposition” experienced in states that give cities broad annexation authority).
annexation, the process of cities annexing “without the consent of the residents or property owners in the annexed area[,]” is an especially contentious subject.

State law primarily dictates municipal annexation. Thus, each state has developed a unique form of annexation policy. Due to the myriad of state annexation procedures, it is best to examine these variations through general classifications. The method used by most states requires voter approval from either the residents of the annexing municipality, the area potentially being annexed, or both. A method commonly employed by states in the New England area involves special legislative acts to approve boundary changes. A process used by states in the middle and far west requires state administrative agencies or boards to approve annexation plans.

19. Involuntary annexation is also called “forced” and “unilateral” annexation. Tyson, supra note 16, at 300.
20. Id.
21. Tyson, supra note 14, at 511 (“Annexation laws are not controlled by the federal government . . . .”). While annexation is mostly under the authority of states, the U.S. Supreme Court helped shape the foundation of the issue. In Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, the Supreme Court declared:

Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the [s]tate . . . . The [s]tate, therefore, at its pleasure, may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest.

22. See Jaime L. Palmer & Greg Lindsey, Classifying State Approaches to Annexation, 33 ST. & LOC. GOV’T R. 60, 60 (2001) (“[N]o two states provide for precisely the same procedures.”).
23. See generally id. (detailing the various types of annexation policy).
24. See Dustin Cammack, Comment, Municipal Manifest Destiny: Constitutionality of Unilateral Municipal Annexations, 2013 BYU L. REV. 619, 622 (2013) (“Under a system of popular determination, some combination of residents of the annexing municipality, the annexation area, and the local government from which the annexation area will be taken . . . vote directly to approve the annexation.”); see also Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 22, at 69 (analyzing data that shows more than half of the states use some type of popular determination as the main method for approving annexations).
25. See Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 22, at 69 (“Legislative determination is used most often in . . . New England or eastern states . . . .”).
28. See Cammack, supra note 24, at 623 (“In a quasi-legislative jurisdiction, the state legislature delegates its power to approve or initiate boundary changes to an administrative agency, independent board, or non-judicial tribunal.”).
Another scheme, albeit rarely used, utilizes a panel of judges to authorize annexation proposals. The last general annexation method used by states, and the most liberal one, is involuntary annexation.

Involuntary annexation has been employed primarily by states in the Sunbelt region, including the State of Texas. Despite the predominate use of involuntary annexation in the past, state legislatures have increasingly given residents and property owners greater control over the annexation process. In 2010, states that allowed some form of annexation without consent included North Carolina, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska, Tennessee, Texas, Delaware, and Idaho. By the end of 2017, three of these states passed legislation severely restricting the use of involuntary annexation. This trend is largely due to the efforts of

29. See id. at 624 (discussing the state of Virginia’s “three-judge panel to approve annexations”); see also Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 22, at 69 (“Judicial determination is the main method in only [one] state . . . .”).
30. See Cammack, supra note 24, at 624 (“A few states give broad annexation powers to municipal governments, allowing them to freely annex . . . all with little or no involvement by annexed residents, landowners, or their elected representatives.”).
31. See Briffault, supra note 27, at 80 (“Much of the population growth of the large cities of the Sunbelt in recent decades is a result of substantial territorial expansion attributable to the liberal annexation laws of those states.”).
32. See id. at 80 n.339 (“In the postwar period, Texas has led all states in population and land area annexed.”).
33. See Tyson, supra note 14, at 511 (“Forcible annexation was the predominant doctrine in the states during the nineteenth century.”).
34. See Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 22, at 69–71 (concluding state legislatures have decreased municipalities’ ability to annex without consent and have “increased opportunities for property owners to affect or control the outcome of annexation proposals”).
36. IND. CODE ANN. § 36-4-3-3 (2011).
40. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 43.
citizens and communities fighting against involuntary annexation, claiming the process violates the basic principal of self-determination, amounts to taxation without representation, and infringes on private property rights.

B. Initial Development of Municipal Annexation Laws in Texas

Under the Republic of Texas and later under the State of Texas, cities formed and derived power through legislative acts. This limitation on municipal authority meant cities had to obtain legislative approval to extend their boundaries. Texas municipalities were granted some authority in 1858 when the legislature gave cities the ability to incorporate without a

TEX. LOC. GOVT’ CODE § 43) (amending the prior statute and reforming involuntary municipal annexation). Although it appears that Indiana cities can still annex without consent, there are now stricter procedural requirements. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 36-4-3-5.1 (West 2011) (detailing the requirements of notices to the public).

44. See Tyson, supra note 16, at 300 (claiming all states allowing involuntary annexation “are facing some level of organized opposition”); see also Tyson, supra note 14, at 520 (“Annexation is now widely perceived as a threat to individual liberty and autonomous self-government, pitting metropolitan region residents against metropolitan region central city governments.”).


46. See Harris v. City of Hous., 151 F.3d 186, 191–92 (5th Cir. 1998) (DeMoss, J., dissenting) (claiming the involuntary annexation of the Kingwood community violated the fundamental principal of “no taxation without representation”).

47. See FIELDS & QUINTERO, supra note 45, at 15–16 (arguing annexation is a form of regulatory taking); Tyson, supra note 16, at 327 (describing the belief held by some “that one is entitled to have their property located in a particular municipal jurisdiction and . . . infringement of that right through the adjustment of municipal boundaries is akin to an infringement of vested rights in private property”).


49. See Brown v. City of Galveston, 75 S.W. 488, 495 (Tex. 1903) (“In [Texas] the doctrine is well settled that a municipal corporation can exist only by and through an act of the [l]egislature of the [s]tate, and that it has no power not granted by the charter, and can have no officer not provided for by law.” (citing Blessing v. City of Galveston, 42 Tex. 641, 657–58 (1874); Pye v. Peterson, 45 Tex. 312 (1876); Vosburg v. McGregor, 14 S.W. 195 (1890)); see also Scott Houston, Municipal Annexation: A Key Remedy for “Reverse Intergovernmental Aid”, 15 TEX. TECH. ADMIN. L.J. 329, 342 (2014) (“[T]he legislature passed a bill . . . that incorporated a city and delineated its powers and duties.”).

50. Maddrey v. Cox, 11 S.W. 541, 542 (Tex. 1889) (recognizing the power of the legislature to “extend the boundaries of an existing corporation, without the consent, or even against the remonstrance, of a majority or all the inhabitants of the existing corporation or of the territory to be annexed” (emphasis added)). As demonstrated in Maddrey, involuntary annexation has deep roots in Texas. Id. at 542–43.
special legislative act\textsuperscript{51} and the power to expand their boundaries if residents of the proposed annexed area petitioned to be included in the city.\textsuperscript{52}

The Home Rule Amendment of 1912\textsuperscript{53} led to a major shift in annexation authority.\textsuperscript{54} This constitutional amendment granted “\textit{[c]ities having more than five thousand . . . inhabitants}” the power to “adopt or amend their charters” so long as they are not inconsistent with the general laws or constitution.\textsuperscript{55} The following year, the legislature passed a law granting specific powers to home rule cities,\textsuperscript{56} including the power to extend boundary lines.\textsuperscript{57} Annexation authority given to home rule cities by the 1913 Act was essentially unrestricted\textsuperscript{58} and allowed annexation of any


\textsuperscript{52} Robert R. Ashcroft & Barbara Kyle Balfour, \textit{Home Rule Cities and Municipal Annexation in Texas: Recent Trends and Future Prospects}, 15 ST. MARY’S L.J. 519, 521 (1984) (“Under the general laws cities were granted the right to annex territory without obtaining the permission of the [[l]egislature only when . . . a majority of the qualified electors of the territory to be annexed indicated their desire to be included in the municipality.”).

\textsuperscript{53} TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5.

\textsuperscript{54} See Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 522 (“[T]he legislative powers were taken from the [[l]egislature and given directly to home rule cities by the constitution.”). Other states experienced similar trends due to criticism over the Dillion theory that municipalities should only have the power specifically granted to them by state legislatures and statutes. See Fields & Quintero, supra note 45, at 5 (discussing Iowa Supreme Court Justice John Forrest Dillion’s “legal theory that localities should wield no more authority than that specifically delegated to them by state statutes”).

\textsuperscript{55} TEX. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a); see also id. § 5 interp. commentary (West 2007) (explaining the Home Rule Amendment of 1912).

\textsuperscript{56} Act approved April 7, 1913, 33d Leg., R.S., ch. 147, §§ 1–10, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 307, 310–17 (repealed 1995). There are three basic types of municipalities in Texas: general law, home rule, and special law. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 5.001–.005. The formation and functions of general law cities are “pursuant to legislation” and not a city charter that is specific to the municipality. Brooks, supra note 18, § 3.03. Home rule cities are those that “operate under a municipal charter that has been adopted or amended as authorized by Article XI, Section 5, of the Texas Constitution.” TEX. LOC. GOV’T § 5.004. Special law cities “are those created by discreet acts of the legislature.” Brooks, supra note 18, § 3.03. General law and special-law cities’ authority to annex was mostly unchanged by MARVA, and so home rule cities are the focus of this comment. See Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 6, §§ 1–57, sec. 43, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 4505, 4505–26 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE § 45).

\textsuperscript{57} Act approved April 7, 1913, ch. 147, § 4, 1913 Tex. Gen. Laws 307, 310.

\textsuperscript{58} See Truman O’Quinn, Annexing New Territory: A Review of Texas Law and the Proposals for Legislative Control of Cities Extending Their Boundaries, 39 TEX. L. REV. 172, 174–75 (1960) (discussing annexation laws prior to the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963 as providing cities with the ability to “extend[ ] their corporate limits, without legislative standards, restraints, or limitations”); Fields & Quintero, supra note 45, at 5 (claiming cities that adopted home-rule charters had “virtually no limit whatsoever on the authority . . . to annex”).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol50/iss2/5
amount of land, any type of land without notice to residents, and without the consent of residents. Some commentators believe this overly broad power led to land grabbing and other “annexation abuses” that eventually gave rise to legislative action in the 1960s.

C. Evolution of Modern Annexation Laws

Home rule cities had nearly unrestricted annexation authority until the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963, which marked the beginning of a slow but continuous trend chipping away at municipal annexation authority. Although home rule cities were still allowed to annex without consent, the 1963 Act “radically changed the authority and procedure” for annexing. The greatest change created by the 1963 Act was limiting annexation to either a city’s extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) or city-owned property. Additional limitations included barring annexation of incorporated areas within the ETJ, limits to the amount of land that can be annexed, and the requirement that cities provide “governmental and proprietary services.”

59. See Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 525–26 (“Limitations were not imposed on the amount of land that could be annexed . . . .”).

60. See Texas ex rel. Pan Am. Prod. Co. v. Tex. City, 303 S.W.2d 780, 782 (Tex. 1957) (restating municipal authority to expand boundaries “without regard to the use or character of the occupation of the annexed territory” (quoting State v. City of Waxahachie, 17 S.W. 348, 350 (Tex. 1891))).

61. Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 525 (“No notice requirements or time limits were imposed on home rule cities initiating the annexation process.”).

62. See O’Quinn, supra note 58, at 174 (discussing annexation laws prior to the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963 as providing cities with the ability to annex “without consent of the residents of the territory being annexed”).

63. Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 523–24.

64. See id. at 526 (suggesting the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963 was passed “[i]n response to annexation wars and to prevent such abuses from continuing”).


66. See Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 530 (asserting the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963 began the “process of restricting cities’ power to annex”).

67. BROOKS, supra note 18, § 1.13.

68. Extraterritorial jurisdiction (ETJ) is defined as “the unincorporated area, not a part of any other city, which is contiguous to the corporate limits of any city[.]” Municipal Annexation Act, ch. 160, art. I, § 3(A), 1963 Tex. Gen. Laws 447, 447 (amended 1987). ETJs extend five miles or less outside city boundaries. Id. at 447–48. As the city’s boundary expands, the ETJ “expand[s] in conformity with such annexation and shall comprise an area around the new corporate limits[.]” Id. at 448.

69. Id. § 7(A), at 450.

70. Id. § 3(A), at 447.

71. Id. § 7(B), at 450 (“A city may annex in any one calendar year only territory equivalent in size to ten per cent (10%) of the total corporate area . . . .”).
to the annexed area within three years of annexation that are “substantially equivalent” to those services provided in other parts of the city. Municipalities were given some control over their ETJs, but they could not impose taxes. Procedural changes created by the 1963 Act required a public hearing prior to annexation, newspaper notice of the hearing, and completion of annexation within ninety days of instituting the proceeding.

After the passage of the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963, no significant changes were made to cities’ annexation authority until the end of the twentieth century. S.B. 89, passed by the Texas legislature in 1999, made significant changes to annexation law in response to Houston’s involuntary annexation of a neighboring community. In 1996, the City of Houston proposed to annex the Kingwood community located within the city’s ETJ. Despite resistance from Kingwood residents, Houston’s City Council voted to annex the community. After unsuccessful judicial attempts to stop the annexation, S.B. 89 was introduced and subsequently

72. Id. § 10(A), at 452.
73. Cities could extend their subdivision ordinances to the ETJ area. Id. § 4, at 449. Cities also had the power to designate an area as an “industrial district” and provide temporary exemption from being annexed. Id. § 5, at 449. This industrial district designation was a tool used by cities to attract new business and development into the ETJ. See Ashcroft & Balfour, supra note 52, at 529 (discussing how the exemption of industrial districts “was effectively a tax abatement scheme”).
75. Id. § 6, at 449–50.
76. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 48 (2016) (noting the Legislative act passed in 1999, S.B. 89, was “the first comprehensive reform of the annexation laws [in Texas] since the Municipal Annexation Act of 1963”).
79. Harris v. City of Hous., 151 F.3d 186, 187 (5th Cir. 1998).
80. Kingwood residents resisted the annexation due to concerns over “increased taxation and a decrease in the quality of municipal services.” Tyson, supra note 16, at 321. Some residents of Houston also opposed the annexation “alleg[ing] that both the purpose and effect of the annexation were to dilute the votes of minority residents[.]” Harris, 151 F.3d at 188.
81. Harris, 151 F.3d at 187.
82. Id. (vacating “the district court’s prior orders and remand[ing] with instructions to dismiss the case as moot”).
passed by the seventy-sixth legislature. Under S.B. 89, cities were required to prepare a proposal identifying the areas to be annexed and wait three years before commencing the plan. In addition to holding public hearings, cities were required to give written notice to every property owner and service provider in the area. Cities were also required to develop and publish a plan for extending full municipal services to the annexed area. Another major hurdle for municipalities under the amended law was the requirement of cities with less than 1.6 million people to negotiate with the annexed community over either the services that would be provided after annexation or services in lieu of annexation.

Many initial supporters of S.B. 89 felt the final version of the bill was not enough to protect property rights, and thus the fight to end involuntary annexation continued. Legislators’ persistent efforts proved successful in 2017 when the eighty-fifth legislative session essentially ended involuntary annexation in Texas.

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION RIGHT TO VOTE ACT

After the eighty-fourth legislative session, the Senate Committee on Intergovernmental Relations and the House Committee on Land and Resource Management issued interim charges addressing legislative recommendations on annexation. Neither committee explicitly proposed

84. Id. § 4, sec. 43.052(c), at 4075.
85. Id. § 4, sec. 43.052(f)(1)–(2), at 4076.
86. Id. § 7, sec. 43.056(a), at 4079–81.
87. Id. § 8, sec. 43.0562(a)(1), at 4083.
89. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 48 (2016) (stating Texas legislators made several attempts after S.B.89 “to amend municipal authority on annexation”; Houston, supra note 49, at 343 (“[B]ills to curb annexations have surfaced in every session for the past fifty years.” (quoting Scott Houston, TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION IN TEXAS: “IS IT REALLY THAT COMPLICATED?” 6 (2012), https://www.tml.org/legal_pdf/ANNEXATION.pdf [https://perma.cc/U86J-7WMD])).
90. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 43.0671, .0681, .0691 (requiring cities in populous counties to obtain consent prior to annexation of an area).
91. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 2 (2016) (requesting the committee “[c]ompare current regulatory authority available to municipalities in their extraterritorial jurisdiction. Study current annexation
voter approved annexations, but both recommended reforming the annexation process in a way that gives citizens impacted by annexation more power.92 Legislators of the eighty-fifth session responded to the committees’ advice by introducing a bill reforming involuntary annexation,93 but it was successfully filibustered by opponents in the final hours of the regular session.94

A special session was called and municipal annexation reform was included as one of several issues to be considered.95 S.B. 6, an annexation reform bill similar to the regular session bill, passed in the senate.96 The house made several changes to S.B. 6, including reducing the number of cities significantly affected by the new law,97 reducing the time a city could

---

92. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 71 (2016) (recommending the legislature “[r]econsider annexation reform[,] which will balance the powers between private property owners and municipalities”); S. COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 2 (2016) (asking the committee to “[i]dentify areas of concern in regards to statutory extraterritorial jurisdiction expansion and the processes used by municipalities for annexation, specifically reviewing whether existing statute strikes the appropriate balance between safeguarding private property rights and encouraging orderly growth and economic development”).


95. See Bobby Blanchard, 20 Things Gov. Greg Abbott Wants Lawmakers to Address in a Special Session, TEX. TRIB. (June 6, 2017), https://www.texastribune.org/2017/06/06/heres-all-20-items-gov-greg-abbott-wants-lawmakers-address-special-ses/ [https://perma.cc/54XP-XX9A] (listing “[m]unicipal annexation reform” as one of the several items legislators were to consider during the special session).


97. See H. Comm. on Land & Res. Mgmt., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017) (changing the definition of a “tier 1 county” from a county “with a population of less than 125,000” to “a population of less than 500,000”). The senate version of the bill, as it pertains to the requirement of obtaining consent to annex, would have applied to twenty-three additional Texas counties. See
begin the annexation process after an unsuccessful attempt,\textsuperscript{98} and giving cities more authority over annexing land surrounding military bases.\textsuperscript{99} S.B. 6, named the Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act (MARVA),\textsuperscript{100} was signed by the governor on August 15, 2017\textsuperscript{101} and took effect on December 1, 2017.\textsuperscript{102}

IV. THE MUNICIPAL ANNEXATION RIGHT TO VOTE ACT

MARVA amended Chapter 43 of the Texas Local Government Code\textsuperscript{103} and significantly reduced home rule cities’ annexation authority.\textsuperscript{104} Below is a discussion of the key changes to annexation law created by MARVA.

A. Tier 1 and Tier 2 Municipality Definitions

MARVA adds “tier 1 county,” “tier 2 county,” “tier 1 municipality,” and “tier 2 municipality” definitions to section 43.001 of the Local Government Code, which designates a home rule city’s authority to annex.\textsuperscript{105} A “tier 1 county” is any county “with a population of less than 500,000[.]”\textsuperscript{106} A “tier 2 county” is any county with a population over 500,000.\textsuperscript{107} A “tier 1 municipality” is a city located in one or more tier 1 counties that is annexing an area located in a tier 1 county.\textsuperscript{108} A “tier 2 municipality” is any city

---


\textsuperscript{99} See id. (increasing annexation authority over the land area around military bases from a quarter of a mile to five miles).

\textsuperscript{100} S. Comm. on State Affairs, Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S. (2017).

\textsuperscript{101} Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 6, § 57, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 4505, 4526 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 43).

\textsuperscript{102} Id.

\textsuperscript{103} The act also amended sections of the Special District Local Laws Code and repealed section 5.701(n)(6) of the Water Code. Id. §§ 44–53, 55(c), at 4521–26 (codified at TEX. SPEC. DIST. CODE §§ 8395.151–9039.110).

\textsuperscript{104} Id. § 3, sec. 43.003, at 4506 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE § 43.003). Annexation authority and procedures for general-law municipalities did not substantially change under the amended law. See TEX. LOC. GOV'T CODE ANN. §§ 43.023–43.027, 43.032–034 (relating to annexation authority of general-law cities).

\textsuperscript{105} Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act, ch. 6, § 1, sec. 43.001, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 4505, 4506–06.

\textsuperscript{106} Id.

\textsuperscript{107} Id. Also included in the definition of a “tier 2 county” are counties of any size with “a freshwater fisheries center operated by the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department” and any tier 1 county in which residents elect to be designated as a tier 2 county. Id.

\textsuperscript{108} Id.
“wholly or partly located in a tier 2 county [] or wholly located in one or more tier 1 counties that proposes to annex an area wholly or partially located in a tier 2 county.”109 The annexation authority of a city designated as a tier 1 municipality did not substantially change under MARVA.110 However, the annexation authority of a city designated as a tier 2 municipality changed considerably.111

B. Tier 2 Municipality Annexation Authority

MARVA created three main classifications of annexation authority and procedures for tier 2 municipalities: annexation of an area based on request of owners,112 annexation of an area with a population less than 200,113 and annexation of an area with a population of more than 200.114 While the procedure varies for all three categories, each one requires some form of consent from the residents and property owners of the area proposed for annexation.115 Consent is required not only for full annexations but also for limited purpose annexations.116

C. Tier 2 Municipality Annexation on Request of Owners

Subchapter C–3 of Local Government Code Chapter 43 provides the authority and procedures for annexing areas based on the request of landowners.117 Tier 2 municipalities have the authority to “annex an area

109. Id. at 4505–06.
110. See id. §§ 12–14, secs. 43.0205, .0505, at 4508 (amending Subchapters B and C–1, Chapter 43 of the Local Government Code to apply only to tier 1 municipalities).
112. Id. § 26, secs. 43.067–.0673, at 4512–13.
113. Id. § 26, secs. 43.068–.0688, at 4513–15.
114. Id. § 26, secs. 43.069–.0699, at 4515–17.
115. See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 43.0671 (allowing tier 2 municipalities to annex “an area if each owner of land in the area requests the annexation’’); id. § 43.0681 (granting tier 2 municipalities the authority to annex an area with less than 200 people after obtaining consent through a petition signed by a majority of registered voters in the area); id. § 43.0691 (requiring a tier 2 municipality to obtain consent through an election prior to annexation of an area with more than 200 people).
116. See id. §§ 43.121–1211 (requiring tier 2 municipalities with more than 225,000 residents to “annex an area for the limited purposes of applying its planning, zoning, health, and safety ordinances in the area’’).
117. Id. §§ 43.067–.0673. Sponsors of MARVA state one of the objectives of the bill was to “reduce[] bureaucracy to expedite voluntary annexation when cities and land owners can agree on
if each owner of land in the area requests the annexation."118  Prior to annexation under Subchapter C–3, the municipality must negotiate and enter into a service agreement with landowners.119  The municipality must also hold at least two public hearings before adopting an ordinance to annex the area.120

D. Tier 2 Municipality Annexation of an Area with a Population Less Than 200

Subchapter C–4 of Local Government Code Chapter 43 provides the authority and procedures for annexing areas with a population under 200.121  A tier 2 municipality may annex an area with a population of less than 200 if consent is obtained through a petition signed by more than 50% of registered voters of the area and more than 50% of land owners if registered voters in the area do not own more than half of the area being annexed.122  Prior to collecting signatures for the petition, the municipality must adopt a resolution pertaining to the proposed annexation,123 mail notice of the proposed annexation to “each resident and property owner[,]”124 and conduct a public hearing.125

The municipality has five months to collect signatures from registered voters and landowners.126  If the municipality fails to collect the requisite number of signatures, then it is banned from proposing annexation of the area for a year.127  If the municipality collects the requisite amount of

---

118. TEX. LOC. GOV’T § 43.0671 (emphasis added).  Subchapter C–3 does not address how landowners make the request. Id. §§ 43.067–.0673.
119. Id. § 43.0672.
120. Id. § 43.0673.  The municipality must also provide notice of the public hearings. Id. § 43.0673(d).
121. Id. §§ 43.068–.0688.
122. See id. §§ 43.068–.0681 (declaring additional consent from land owners is not required if the registered voters in the area own at least 50% of the land to be annexed).
123. Id. § 43.0682.  Resolutions must include the intent to annex, a map of the area that will be annexed, and a list and schedule of services that will be provided to the area by the municipality. Id.
124. Id. § 43.0683.  Notices must be mailed no later than seven days after adopting the resolution. Id.
125. Id. § 43.0684.  At least one public hearing must be held within twenty-one to thirty days after adopting the resolution. Id.
126. Id. § 43.0685.  The municipality has 180 days from the adoption of the resolution but cannot begin collecting signatures until after notices have been mailed and the first public hearing has been conducted. Id. § 43.0685(b).
127. Id. § 43.0686(b).
signatures then it must notify the residents and property owners of the area and hold additional public hearings.\textsuperscript{128} Even if the municipality obtains enough signatures from residents and landowners of the area proposed for annexation, residents of the municipality can block the annexation.\textsuperscript{129}

E. \textit{Tier 2 Municipality Annexation of an Area with a Population More Than 200}

Subchapter C–5 of Local Government Code Chapter 43 provides the authority and procedures for annexing areas with a population over 200.\textsuperscript{130} A tier 2 municipality may annex an area with a population greater than 200 only after holding an election in the proposed annexation area and obtaining voter approval.\textsuperscript{131} If registered voters in the area being annexed do not own more than half of the land, then a petition signed by more than 50% of the landowners is required in addition to the election.\textsuperscript{132} Prior to the election, the municipality must adopt a resolution pertaining to the proposed annexation,\textsuperscript{133} mail notice of the proposed annexation to “each property owner in the area[,]”\textsuperscript{134} and conduct public hearings.\textsuperscript{135}

The annexing municipality must wait at least ninety days after adopting the resolution to hold the election and shall pay all the costs.\textsuperscript{136} If property owner consent is required, then petition signatures will be collected first,
and an election will only occur if more than 50% of the owners approve the annexation. If a majority of voters do not approve the annexation or if the municipality does not obtain the requisite amount of signatures when a petition is required, then the municipality is barred from proposing annexation of the area for a year. If a majority of voters approve the proposed annexation and the municipality collects the requisite amount of signatures when a petition is required, then the municipality must notify residents of the proposed area and hold additional public hearings. Even if residents and property owners of the proposed area approve the annexation, residents of the municipality can prevent the annexation.

F. Exceptions to the Requirement of Consent

MARVA carved out specific instances when a tier 2 municipality may annex an area without the consent of residents and owners. Cities located in populous counties can annex enclaves within their ETJ without obtaining consent. Other areas that a tier 2 municipality can involuntarily annex include “industrial districts”; navigable streams

---

137. TEX. LOC. GOV’T §§ 43.0695(a), 43.0696(a)(2). The municipality has 180 days from the adoption of the resolution to collect signatures but cannot begin collecting until after notice has been mailed and the first public hearing is conducted. Id. § 43.0685(b).
138. Id. § 43.0697.
139. Id. § 43.0697(c).
140. See id. § 43.0698 (allowing residents of the municipality to lobby against the annexation by signing “a petition protesting the annexation of an area”).
141. See Municipal Annexation Right to Vote Act, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., ch. 6, §§ 4–9, secs. 43.026, .027, .031, .035, .051, 2017 Tex. Gen. Laws 4505, 4506–08 (codified at TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE §§ 43.011–.016) (creating a new subchapter to Chapter 43 of the Local Government Code which applies to both tier 1 and tier 2 municipalities).
142. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN.§ 43.0115. This exception only applies when the annexing city is located in a county with two or more cities each with a population over 300,000 and the area proposed for annexation is “wholly surrounded by a municipality” and “has fewer than 100 dwelling units.” Id. § 43.0115(a).
143. Id. § 43.0116. Industrial district is defined as “the meaning customarily given to the term but also includes any area in which tourist-related businesses and facilities are located.” Id. § 42.044(a). Municipalities may designate any area within its ETJ as an industrial district and can “treat the designated area in a manner considered by the governing body to be in the best interests of the municipality.” Id. § 42.044(b). Municipalities will enter into agreements with landowners within the industrial district, which typically includes immunity from annexation for a specific time period. Id. § 42.044(c). This means that municipalities cannot involuntarily annex components of an industrial district that are subject to immunity until after the contracts with landowners expire. Id. § 43.0116(b).
adjacent to the municipality,144 and land that qualifies for agricultural use, wildlife management use, or timber land.145

MARVA created a separate provision pertaining to annexing land surrounding military bases.146 A municipality may annex the area surrounding military bases that conduct active training programs.147 Tier 2 municipalities are still required to allow residents in the proposed annexation area surrounding the military base to vote on the matter, but if the annexation is not approved, the municipality will have “the authority to adopt and enforce an ordinance regulating the land use in the area in the manner recommended by the most recent joint land use study.”148

V. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR CITIES AND THE STATE OF TEXAS

Supporters of property rights and the fight to end involuntary annexation were victorious in the passing of MARVA.149 While the concerns of those opposed to involuntary annexation are understandable,150 MARVA disproportionately shifted the balance of power away from municipalities.151 The following are areas of concern that cities and Texas as a whole should be prepared for as a result of the new annexation laws.

144. Id. § 43.013; see also City of Nassau Bay v. Winograd, 582 S.W.2d 505, 508 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (explaining a city can regulate the land area around an annexed stream for limited purposes but cannot exercise general regulatory powers).
145. TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 43.016.
146. See id. § 43.0117 (defining “military base” as “a presently functioning federally owned or operated military installation or facility”).
147. See id. § 43.0117(b) (“A municipality may annex . . . any part of the area located within five miles of the boundary of a military base . . . .”).
148. Id.
150. See Edwards, supra note 17, at 119 (“Annexation is often perceived as a process that strictly benefits annexing cites at the expense of the annexed, as it may be pursued simply to enhance tax base.”).
151. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 71 (2016) (recommending lawmakers create annexation legislation that strikes “a balance of powers between property owners and municipalities to ensure the success of [the] Texas economy”).
A. Annexation in Populous Counties Will Significantly Decrease

Under the laws created by MARVA, municipal annexation in populous counties\(^{152}\) is not likely to occur.\(^{153}\) Even if a municipality can get approval to annex an area, it requires a costly process that city residents will have to cover.\(^{154}\) Additionally, fringe communities that consent to annexation may not be beneficial for the annexing municipality because the cost of the new area may exceed the revenues generated by the annexed community.\(^{155}\)

The inability to annex may lead to fragmentation within metropolitan

\(^{152}\) Tier 2 counties subject to strict annexation requirements include Harris, Dallas, Tarrant, Bexar, Travis, Collin, Hidalgo, El Paso, Denton, Fort Bend, Montgomery, and Williamson. Population Estimates for Texas Counties, 2010-2017, TEX. ST. LIBR. & ARCHIVES COMM’N, https://www.tsl.texas.gov/ref/abouttx/popcnty201011.html [https://perma.cc/R77Y-RBKS]. Although this only includes twelve of the 254 counties in Texas, these counties are home to more than 60% of Texas residents. See id. (reporting the estimated total population in 2016 for all counties with more than 500,000 people as comprising of 63% of the total population of Texas). It is estimated that the Dallas area will be the least effected by the amended law due to the land-locked nature of the region. PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 19.

\(^{153}\) See Palmer & Lindsey, supra note 22, at 69 ("Annexation occurs less often in states that make annexation contingent upon approval by referendum or written consent of property owners or residents in the territory to be annexed."); see also Tyson, supra note 14, at 514 (explaining how approval of annexation by residents or property owners of the area proposed for annexation is unlikely considering that this puts “all power over boundary change in the hands of those of who may have deliberately fled the central city and are therefore likely opposed to its expansion"). During the November 2018 midterm elections, residents living in San Antonio’s ETJ around the Lackland and Camp Bullis military bases voted on whether they wanted to be annexed for limited purposes. Iris Dimmick, Residents of Military Buffer Zones to Vote on Annexation in November, RIVARD REP. (Aug. 2, 2018), https://therivardreport.com/residents-of-military-buffer-zones-to-vote-on-annexation-in-november/# [https://perma.cc/GZ89-8Y52]. The results were overwhelmingly against annexation. Van Darden, Election Results: Charter Amendments, Annexation Results, KSAT (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.ksat.com/news/politics/election-results-charter-amendments-annexation-results [https://perma.cc/G56F-2KXG] (reporting that 95% of voters in the Lackland area and 83% of voters in the Camp Bullis area voted against annexation).

\(^{154}\) See TEX. LOC. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 43.009(b) ("The municipality shall pay for the costs of holding the election."); see also Cammack, supra note 24, at 642 (describing the various costs associated with annexation elections). But see H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., at 4 (2017) (claiming the costs associated with an annexation election “would be minimal and easily recouped if annexation were successful”).

\(^{155}\) See, e.g., H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 52 (2016) (describing some of the issues associated with uncontrolled development including “traffic issues, grid-lock, [and] right-away issues”). Annexing communities that developed without regulatory controls in place will likely require financial resources to fix problems which could have potentially been avoided. See Laurie Reynolds, Rethinking Municipal Annexation Powers, 24 URB. LAW. 247, 249 (1992) ("Involuntary municipal annexation power is a preferable method of ensuring orderly urban growth and equitable provision of municipal services.").
regions. Fragmentation is undesirable because it can reduce economic competitiveness of a region, create socioeconomic segregation, and influence other factors that negatively impact the economic development of a region. Unincorporated communities protected from annexation by the newly amended law may also experience increases in uncontrolled and undesirable development, which can create infrastructure issues, affect property values, and negatively impact the environment.

156. See Tyson, supra note 16, at 348 (“The ability of a municipality to annex land within its metropolitan region can be a key tool in limiting . . . municipal fragmentation . . . .”).

157. See JERRY PAYTAS, DOES GOVERNANCE MATTER? THE DYNAMICS OF METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE AND COMPETITIVENESS 22 (2001) (concluding “fragmented governance at the metropolitan level reduces the competitiveness of the metropolitan economy”); see also Tyson, supra note 14, at 531 (arguing that mid-size cities best way of competing on an international level is for the entire region to work together).

158. See RUSK, supra note 11, at 2 (“[T]he more a region is broken up into multiple governments . . . the more racially and economically segregated its housing market is . . . .”); John I. Carruthers & Gudmundur F. Ulfarsson, Fragmentation and Sprawl: Evidence from Interregional Analysis, 33 GROWTH & CHANGE 312, 314–17 (2002) (describing how fragmentation contributes to urban sprawl and can lead to socioeconomic segregation).

159. See Tyson, supra note 14, at 532 (“Studies support the contention that fragmentation is bad for metropolitan economic development efforts.”).

160. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 52 (2016) (reporting on “the ill effects when neighboring municipalities do not annex such as uncontrolled traffic issues, grid-lock, right-away issues and not having funding to pay roadways”).

161. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 37 (“[Z]oning grants a city the authority to prohibit detrimental uses and to promote beneficial uses [of land] . . . thereby protecting the quality of life and property values for residents.”); see also Joseph L. Sax, Why America Has a Property Rights Movement, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 513, 515 (2005) (acknowledging that unless early land-planning initiatives are established to give property owners a clearer signal to what they can do with their land, early and late developers will be treated differently in regards to what they are allowed to do with their land).

162. See Janice C. Griffith, Regional Governance Reconsidered, 21 J.L. & POL. 505, 512 (2005) (“Suburban development has left few open spaces to absorb water runoff, to preserve habitat for wildlife, or to provide green space for recreational use.”); CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, REVIEW OF ANNEXATION FINANCIAL ANALYSIS AND BEST PRACTICES 10 (2016), https://www.sanantonio.gov/Portals/0/Files/Planning/Annexation/PFM-Annexation-Financial-Analysis-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/7QED-KRTB] (discussing how counties in Texas have limited zoning powers which means municipal annexation is an “important regional tool to either incentivize or disincentivize growth in a particular area, in order to accomplish broader regional goals such as . . . environmental preservation” (emphasis added)). See, e.g., Edmond Ortiz, City Council Approves Southside Annexation, RIVARD REP. (June 22, 2017), https://therivardreport.com/council-approves-southside-annexation/# [https://perma.cc/R3VE-S8W3] (reporting on the City of San Antonio annexing land so as to put resource protections in an area near a river and around a nature preserve).
B. Fiscal Health Concerns for Cities and Metropolitan Regions

Fringe communities benefit by living near municipalities.\textsuperscript{163} Some of these benefits include employment with businesses located within the city,\textsuperscript{164} access to public spaces; police and fire protection; and healthcare services.\textsuperscript{165} When people utilize municipal funded public services without contributing to the tax base,\textsuperscript{166} city resources become overly burdened.\textsuperscript{167} Involuntary annexation helps cities relieve these burdens,\textsuperscript{168} and thus the inability to annex fringe communities creates a cap on municipal property tax.\textsuperscript{169} Now that involuntary annexation is no longer available for Texas

\textsuperscript{163} See Reynolds, supra note 155, at 253 (acknowledging “perhaps [the] most compelling[ ] interest advanced by the municipality is that annexation of the fringe would merely confirm the reality that these developments are already a functional part of the city they surround”).

\textsuperscript{164} See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 67 (2016) (quoting a study which shows that “80[\%] of residents in [San Antonio’s] ETJ, work within the city”); Edwards, supra note 17, at 121 (describing the process in which city residents move away to the outlying areas of town but “may continue to work in the central cities using municipal services and contributing to even higher city spending”). Many of these companies decide to locate to a city or remain there due to economic development efforts funded by city tax dollars. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 19 (explaining the beneficial economic impact from tax dollars).

\textsuperscript{165} See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., at 5 (2017) (noting fringe residents “rely on infrastructure, cultural attractions, and other essentials that are built and maintained by city tax revenue”); PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 4–5 (listing the services and amenities that central cities often provide to the surrounding area such as “hospitals, universities, cultural arts, sports facilities,” interstate highways, transit hubs, police and fire services, and parks and recreation); Edwards, supra note 17, at 123 (“Municipal advocates also argue that fringe residents are already enjoying urban services and urban infrastructure and not contributing to the finance of them.”).

\textsuperscript{166} This concept is sometimes referred to as “consumption without contribution.” H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 55 (2016). It should be noted that fringe residents do contribute some economic benefits to the city. See id. at 70 (recognizing that fringe residents contribute to city sales tax). However, fringe communities do not contribute to the largest portion of city revenue: city property taxes. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 8 (“Property taxes are the leading source of city revenue.”).

\textsuperscript{167} See Edwards, supra note 17, at 121 (maintaining that people living in fringe communities and not attributing to city revenues “may lead to a situation of fiscal stress”).

\textsuperscript{168} See PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 2 (“Annexation expands the tax base, thus providing funds to support an increasing regional population.”); Cammaack, supra note 24, at 626 (“Unilateral annexation allows municipalities at the heart of a metropolitan area to tax surrounding areas that have benefited from the city’s services and growth, providing for the central city’s logical future growth.”).

\textsuperscript{169} Cf. Edwards, supra note 17, at 131 (portraying policy that prevents annexation as “protect[ing] the desire of fringe residents to avoid municipal obligations, yet enjoy municipal benefits”); Reynolds, supra note 155, at 266 (“[N]onresidents on the fringe should no more have the power to opt out of the responsibilities of urban life than should city residents be able to claim an exemption from taxes to support services they do not use.”).
Cities in populous counties, financial burdens must be relieved elsewhere.\(^{170}\)

Cities in populous counties are now forced to focus on methods other than annexation to increase revenues.\(^{171}\) Municipalities can increase their tax base within the city by utilizing economic development strategies to attract new businesses and residents.\(^{172}\) While these tactics are already used in larger cities,\(^{173}\) most economic development tools are improbable options for mid-size cities, thus making them the most likely to be negatively affected by the reformed laws.\(^{174}\) Municipalities will likely increase taxes on residents living within the city at a rate higher than they otherwise would have,\(^{175}\) which further exacerbates the disproportion in contributions between city residents and fringe residents.\(^{176}\) An increasing tax burden on city residents can lead to more people fleeing to the fringe, thereby adding more to the city’s problems and a continuation of this cycle.\(^{177}\)

---

170. See PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 1–2 (stressing concerns about the prosperity of central cities in metropolitan statistical areas if there are not enough sources of revenue to support growing demands).


173. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 19 (“[L]arger cities have partnered with the state to attract such major developments as a Texas Instruments facility and a Toyota plant.”).

174. See Tyson, supra note 14, at 521 (stating mid-size metropolitan regions have a hard time being economically competitive because “they lack the image, economic and population diversity, and the real and perceived quality of life advantages that large urban regions have in abundance”; HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 19 (“Smaller [Texas] cities are usually on their own to attract business.”)).

175. See Griffith, supra note 162, at 512–13 (“As central cities . . . continue to maintain and operate many facilities used by the region as a whole, they must raise taxes upon their own residents, making the inner city even less affordable . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Raymond & Menifield, supra note 2, at 417 (reporting the results of a study that indicate cities unable to expand their boundaries have the highest taxes).

176. Cf. Reynolds, supra note 155, at 266 (describing the movement against annexation as favoring the interests of a few over the interests of all residents in the region).

177. See PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 21 (describing the cycle when cities cannot meet their financial burdens, “The result is perpetual deterioration on the sustainability of the core of the area, which in turn accelerates flight to outlying areas.”). The following cities help illustrate this concern:
out of the city is especially concerning when one considers that historically most people who flee to the suburbs are wealthy and middle-class families leaving behind a poorer tax base.\textsuperscript{178} In addition to increasing revenues, cities may also be forced to reduce their spending on public services.\textsuperscript{179} Poorly funded public services can make a municipality undesirable to its residents\textsuperscript{180} and can hamper the city’s ability to attract new companies and residents.\textsuperscript{181}

The fiscal issues that municipalities may experience due to annexation reform are not only concerning to cities but also to the entire metropolitan region. Neighboring communities benefit from their proximity to central cities.\textsuperscript{182} This means if the central city suffers, so do the suburbs and the

In 1950, Detroit, Baltimore, Cleveland, and St. Louis were the fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth largest cities in the nation in population. All four of them were prevented from expanding their city limits. Sixty years later, in 2010, all four cities had about the same number of square miles they had in 1950.


\textsuperscript{178.} See Raymond & Menifield, supra note 2, at 405 (claiming “the exit of former middle and upper-class city inhabitants who have since moved beyond the outer reaches of the city” as being largely responsible for the depleting tax bases in metropolitan areas); Tyson, supra note 14, at 516 (asserting the “initial wave of white flight and a subsequent wave of [multiracial] middle class flight . . . has decimated the tax base . . . of metropolitan region central cities”).

\textsuperscript{179.} See PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 5 (“Without the capacity to annex . . . growing areas and increase its tax base, a city will face potentially insurmountable fiscal challenges.”). Texas municipalities spend more on public services than the state and provide police, fire and EMS, infrastructure, parks and recreations, libraries, and other services. HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 7–9 (2017).

\textsuperscript{180.} See PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 21 (describing the diminishing quality of urban centers as tarnishing the image of the region and reducing retention).

\textsuperscript{181.} See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., at 5 (2017) (predicting involuntary annexation reform “could threaten essential economic development incentives funded and offered by cities, which are key to staying competitive with other states and attracting businesses and new residents to Texas”); PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 21 (stressing a deteriorating city has reduced “prospects for business locations [and] expansions”).

\textsuperscript{182.} See H. Research Org., Bill Analysis, Tex. S.B. 6, 85th Leg., 1st C.S., at 5 (2017) (noting fringe residents “rely on infrastructure, cultural attractions, and other services that are built and maintained by city tax revenue”); H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 67 (2016) (relaying testimony pertaining to a study which shows that a majority of residents in San Antonio’s ETJ, work within San Antonio); PERRYMAN GRP., supra note 12, at 4 (listing the services and amenities that central cities often provide to the surrounding area such as hospitals, universities, cultural arts, sports facilities, interstate highways, transit hubs, police and fire services, and parks and recreation).
entire metropolitan region.\footnote{See Perryman Grp., supra note 12, at 1–3, 5 (implying fringe communities will be negatively affected by a deteriorating city center).} To offset the potential negative impacts of annexation reform, communities within metropolitan regions have to work collectively to attract new businesses\footnote{See, e.g., Paul Bell & Eric Bell, Opinion, Amazon: Choose San Austin, RIVARD REP. (Sept. 16, 2017), https://therivardreport.com/amazon-choose-san-austin/ [https://perma.cc/DKJ4-YV1Z] (encouraging city leaders of the neighboring cities Austin and San Antonio to collectively propose a regional bid to Amazon).} and manage growth.\footnote{See Griffith, supra note 162, at 517 (describing “smart growth” practices available to regions to help counter sprawl).} Counties may also have to take on a larger governance role,\footnote{See Raymond & Menifield, supra note 2, at 415–16 (discussing city-county consolidation as an alternative way to counter deteriorating effects of suburban flight); Economic Development Handbook, supra note 172, at 170–73 (reviewing city-county cooperative efforts).} although this would require significant legislative efforts.\footnote{See Rusk, supra note 11, at 12 (“State legislatures should mandate regional tax-base-sharing programs . . . .”); Kristen Clarke, Voting Rights & City-County Consolidations, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 626 (2006) (describing the rarity of referendums for city-county consolidation being approved by voters). See generally id., for a further discussion of city-county consolidation.}

C. Statewide Fiscal Concerns

The inability to annex is not only a concern for the cities and regions affected by the reformed law but also the entire state.\footnote{See Houston, supra note 49, at 353 (alleging “eroding annexation authority would be an economic disaster for the State of Texas”).} Texas relies heavily on the economic prosperity of its cities. Unlike the majority of states in the United States, there is no state income tax in Texas.\footnote{See Nicole Kaeding, State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2016, TAX FOUND. (Feb. 8, 2016), https://taxfoundation.org/state-individual-income-tax-rates-and-brackets-2016/ [https://perma.cc/5YSQ-8AAY] (reporting Texas as one of only seven states that did not have a state income tax in 2016).} This means revenue to pay for public services must come from other sources. While the state does have sources of revenue,\footnote{Sources of state revenue in Texas include federal funds, sales tax and other state taxes such as cigarettes, motor vehicle, motor fuel, and franchise. Eva DeLuna Castro & Dick Lavine, Ctr. for Pub. Pol’y Priorities, How Texas Spends its Money: How Texas Gets its Money. Why it Doesn’t Add Up., RIVARD REP. (Feb. 27, 2013), https://therivardreport.com/how-texas-spends-its-money-how-texas-gets-its-money-why-it-doesn’t-add-up/ [https://perma.cc/NTA4-ULTY].} Texas municipalities actually pay for a majority of public services.\footnote{See id. (“Texas”[s] local governments provided $90 billion in public services in 2009, compared to $59 billion from the Texas state budget.”). Texas cities have paid more than the state for public services for over a decade. See id. (“Local taxes have provided the majority of state and local
governments to provide various public services, but most states grant financial aid\textsuperscript{192} to cities to assist in the cost of these services.\textsuperscript{193} This is not the case in Texas where municipalities receive virtually no state aid\textsuperscript{194} and instead contribute funding \textit{to the state}.\textsuperscript{195} Texas municipalities are “compelled to share city-generated revenue with the state[.]”\textsuperscript{196} Examples of Texas cities transferring revenues to the state include administrative fees paid to the state for collecting and processing sales tax,\textsuperscript{197} local participation in state highway projects,\textsuperscript{198} costs associated with municipal courts collecting state fees,\textsuperscript{199} and Texas Commission on Environmental Quality fees.\textsuperscript{200} While the exact amount of money paid by cities to the State of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{192} State aid is “a grant made by the state to cities from revenue generated by the state[.]” HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 14.
\item \textsuperscript{194} See id. at 21 (reporting that only 4% of general revenue for the average Texas city comes from state aid as compared to the United States average of 18%). Only Georgia, Oklahoma, and West Virginia receive a smaller percentage than Texas cities. \textit{Id}.
\item \textsuperscript{195} See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 14–16 (describing the “numerous ways in which cities transfer revenue to the state”).
\item \textsuperscript{196} \textit{Id}. at 14.
\item \textsuperscript{197} \textit{Id}. Revenues from sales tax are transferred to the state in the following manner:

When a Texan purchases a product that is subject to the state and local sales tax, the merchant collects the entire tax due and remits it to the state comptroller. The comptroller, in turn, remits the local share back to the appropriate local government (city, metropolitan transit authority, county, and/or special district). For providing this service and for performing other administrative, enforcement, and reporting duties, the comptroller deducts two percent of the local share of the sales tax and deposits that amount in the state’s general revenue fund.

The two percent fee is high compared to the same fee in other states . . . . A [Texas Municipal League] committee . . . estimate[d] the cost of collection to the state. The committee’s estimate was at most $27.7 million per year, far less than the $107 million paid by cities, [thereby] generating a “profit” of more than $79 million to the state. \textit{Id}.
\item \textsuperscript{198} See \textit{Id}. at 14–15 (explaining an increase in state highway project costs being shared with local governments in response to a request from the Texas Department of Transportation).
\item \textsuperscript{199} \textit{Id}. at 15 (claiming reimbursements to municipalities to cover the administrative cost of collecting state fees are not enough and that increasingly more of the overall fees collected by municipal courts are going to the state and less to the municipality).
\item \textsuperscript{200} See Houston, supra note 49, at 334–35 (asserting the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality is largely funded by local governments).
\end{itemize}
Texas is unclear, the Texas Municipal League has estimated it to be over $250 million per year.201 Not having a state income tax, giving virtually no state aid to cities, and sharing city revenues with the state creates a substantial dependence and burden on Texas cities.202 The average Texas municipality has an array of revenue sources203 but relies heavily on property taxes.204 Although property taxes are higher in Texas than the average state,205 Texans pay one of the lowest overall tax rates.206 Furthermore, even though municipalities significantly depend on property taxes, only 16% of property taxes paid in Texas go to cities.207 Despite all the financial pressure on municipalities, state lawmakers continue to support and pass legislation that chips away at local government’s ability to collect property taxes.208 Decisions in recent years to cap property tax have resulted in a massive state deficit209 and a severely underfunded school finance system.210 The reformed annexation laws created by MARVA place additional limits on cities ability to collect

201. HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 16.
202. See id. at 7 (summarizing a National League of Cities report establishing “the State of Texas relies very heavily on Texas cities to generate the revenue necessary for municipal facilities and services”).
203. Sources of revenues that make up Texas municipal general funds include sales tax, right-of-way rentals, permit fees, and court fines. Id. at 8–9.
204. See DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (“Local property taxes are the primary source of revenue for local governments (school districts, cities, counties, and special districts like community colleges).”). Recent estimates show property tax as accounting for 34% of Texas cities’ general fund revenues. HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 8.
205. See DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (ranking Texas as having the sixteenth highest local tax bill and the fourteenth highest property taxes per capita).
206. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 11 (ranking Texas as “[forty-sixth] in the amount of combined state and local taxes paid by residents”).
207. See id. at 6 (presenting property tax distribution data published by the Texas Comptroller’s Biennial Property Tax report).
208. See Tex. S.B. 2, 85th Leg., R.S. 45 (2017) (proposing a 4% cap on city property tax increases); DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (reporting the Texas Legislature in 2006 “requir[ed] school districts to reduce their school property tax rates by one-third”).
209. The Center for Public Policy Priorities estimates the deficit to be around $10 billion for each biennium since 2006. DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190.
210. See HOW CITIES WORK, supra note 5, at 7 (“[P]ublic schools . . . rely almost exclusively on the property tax . . . .”); DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (asserting the deficit forced the legislature “to make cuts to education that have severely damaged our ability to prepare our kids for the future”). It has been estimated that “[o]ver the last two decades, if state and local taxes had merely been held constant . . . the [l]egislature would have had tens of billions of additional dollars to invest in children.” Id.
property taxes and thereby have the potential to further exacerbate this deficit. In a state that already pays one of the lowest tax rates in the United States, should lawmakers be supporting legislation that continues to lower it even more? This is especially concerning when coupled with the $10 billion deficit and the fact that Texas is a low-spending state. While annexation reform alone is not likely to completely jeopardize Texas’s economy, continued legislation reducing municipal authority may slowly erode away at the economic success of Texas.

VI. CONCLUSION

The passing of MARVA was a clear victory for the property rights movement. Supporters of MARVA fought against involuntary annexation maintaining that it is not fair to force people into the city limits without their consent. While this is a legitimate concern, their argument fails to take into account the benefits of living close to a city. City resources are drained when fringe communities receive benefits provided by

---

211. MARVA essentially creates a cap on property taxes by preventing municipalities from taxing fringe residents that regularly consume benefits provided by the city. Cf. McFarland & Hoene, supra note 193, at 11 (“[S]tate and local tax systems are constrained in significant ways . . . through voter- or state-imposed . . . tax and expenditure limitations . . . .”).

212. Cf. DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (“[T]he $10 billion hole will appear in every state budget until the Legislature fills it with additional revenue.”).

213. See How Cities Work, supra note 5, at 16 (“It’s easy to grasp why some state legislators are tempted to turn to cities and ask them to generate revenue for the state. It’s much harder to understand why some of those same legislators have been trying for several years to limit the revenue-generating capacity of cities by placing caps on the municipal property tax.”).

214. See DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (“Texas is [forty-third] on direct general spending per capita, for state and local government.”).

215. But see Perryman Grp., supra note 12, at 21–22 (predicting involuntary annexation reform will cost the State of Texas $305.7 billion in yearly gross product, $168.8 billion in annual personal income, and 1,234,760 permanent jobs over a thirty-year period).

216. See McFarland & Hoene, supra note 193, at 2 (“To ensure economic vitality, state fiscal systems should provide sufficient fiscal autonomy for localities to fund their share of resident needs.”); see also Rusk, supra note 11, at 11 (“State legislatures should have a vital interest in ensuring the fiscal viability of their state’s municipalities, particularly their major cities.”).

217. See Samuels & Najmabadi, supra note 149 (quoting Texas Senator Donna Campbell as saying the new law “is a huge victory for property rights of Texans”).

218. See, e.g., Fields & Quintero, supra note 45, at 10 (criticizing involuntary annexation as “an unjust exercise of government power”).

municipalities but do not contribute their fair amount of taxes.220
Annexation allowed Texas cities to relieve the burdens created by the fringe
communities.221

MARVA shields fringe community property owners from paying for
benefits they receive from the city and therefore creates a cap on
municipalities’ ability to tax222 and leaves cities to find other ways to relieve
their financial problems.223 The fiscal health of Texas cities is crucial to the
economic strength of the entire state.224 For over a decade, local
governments have contributed more to public services than the State of
Texas225 and with almost no state aid.226 If Texas is going to continue to
heavily depend on local governments, it should be giving cities more tools
instead of taking them away.

While it is unlikely that the new annexation laws will completely
jeopardize Texas’s economy, legislation that continues to restrict municipal
authority may collectively harm the future economic success of Texas and
should not be supported by state lawmakers. “That being said, and in spite
of the legislature’s confusing, continued efforts to harm the state’s economic
engines, city officials in Texas are resilient and will find innovative ways to
keep the Texas miracle alive.”227

220. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 55 (2016) (testimony of the City Manager for the City of Rockport
describing city benefits received by fringe residents as “consumption without contribution”).

221. See Edwards, supra note 17, at 121 (“[A]nnexation has been pursued to offset the fiscal
implications of the migration of middle- and upper-income people fleeing central cities, which may
lead to a situation of fiscal stress.”); see also H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO
THE 85TH TEXAS LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 54 (2016) (quoting the Mayor for the City of Frisco
as saying: “The reason behind forced annexation is to protect the public good.”).

222. See Edwards, supra note 17, at 131 (asserting annexation reform “protects the desire of
fringe residents to avoid municipal obligations, yet enjoy municipal benefits”).

223. See generally REVENUE MANUAL FOR TEXAS CITIES, supra note 171 (listing the various ways
Texas cities can generate revenues).

224. See H. COMM. ON LAND & RES. MGMT., INTERIM REPORT TO THE 85TH TEXAS
LEGISLATURE, 84th Leg., R.S., at 43 (2016) (“The State relies heavily on municipalities to create . . .
stable environments for the growing population all the while enhancing the economic growth.”).

225. See DeLuna Castro & Lavine, supra note 190 (“Local taxes have provided the majority of
state and local taxes for public services in every year since 2002 . . . .”).

226. See McFarland & Hoene, supra note 193, at 21 (reporting how only 4% of Texas cities’
general revenue comes from state aid).

227. TEX. MUN. LEAGUE, HOME RULE CITIES TAKE HEED: ANNEXATION REFORM
EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 1 (2017), https://www.tml.org/legis_updates/home-rule-cities-take-heed-
annexation-reform-effective-december-1 [https://perma.cc/5XMJ-5BGL].